2023-06-13-未来能源研究所-国外干预国内气候政策的统一理论_38页_1mb

In this paper, "A Unifying Theory of Foreign Intervention in Domestic Climate Policy," a theoretical framework is developed to analyze strategic interventions by powerful countries in the climate policies of other nations. Climate change policy options—mitigation, adaptation, and solar geoengineering—vary significantly in their effects and the challenges they pose to international governance. The model employs game theory to examine how interventions—agreements with extraction, transfers, or sanctions—depend on the policy externality, which is influenced by exposure asymmetry and preference divergence.

The analysis reveals that the form of intervention chosen by the dominant country depends on factors such as free riding (excessive reliance on others' policies) or free driving (overprovision of harmful policies). Under power asymmetry, the hegemon can extract gains through agreements, offer incentives via transfers, or enforce compliance through sanctions. These strategies reduce global climate costs by moving toward optimal policy allocations. However, the traditional siloed approach to climate governance is criticized, with the unified framework providing insights into resolving climate negotiation deadlocks.

Key findings include the identification of regions in the policy exposure-preference space where specific interventions are preferred, and the role of distrust and negotiation dynamics in shaping outcomes. The study highlights that addressing climate policy requires innovative governance strategies that consider power dynamics and acknowledge the diverse characteristics of mitigation, adaptation, and geoengineering technologies.