2010年-FSB全球金融稳定委员会_Principles_for_Reducing_Reliance_on_CRA_Ratings_9页_190kb

Summary of Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings

Core Content

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued the Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Rating Agency (CRA) Ratings on 27 October 2010. These principles aim to reduce the financial system's dependence on CRA ratings, which can lead to herding behavior and cliff effects—exacerbating financial instability during crises. The goal is to promote independent credit risk assessment and enhanced risk management practices among market participants.

Main Viewpoints

• Reduction of mechanical reliance on CRA ratings is essential to prevent destabilizing market reactions.
• Alternative creditworthiness standards should be developed and implemented to replace references to CRA ratings in laws, regulations, and standards.
• Transparency and disclosure are critical for fostering market confidence and enabling informed decision-making.
• Internal credit assessment capabilities must be strengthened across all financial institutions, especially banks and investment managers.
• Regulatory oversight and supervisory incentives are necessary to ensure compliance with the new principles.

Key Information

Principle I: Reducing reliance on CRA ratings in standards, laws and regulations

• Standard setters and authorities should remove or replace references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations.
• Transition plans and timelines should be established to ensure safe implementation.
• Enhanced risk management capabilities are required for market participants to support reduced reliance on CRA ratings.

Principle II: Reducing market reliance on CRA ratings

• Firms should make their own credit assessments and not rely solely on CRA ratings.
• Public disclosure of credit assessment approaches and the extent of CRA rating usage is necessary.
• Supervisors should monitor internal credit assessment processes to avoid upward biases.

Principle III.1: Central bank operations

• Central banks should make independent credit judgments on financial instruments.
• They should avoid mechanistic use of CRA ratings to prevent abrupt changes in eligibility and haircuts.
• Communication and market operations should be designed to reduce uncertainty and promote transparency.

Principle III.2: Prudential supervision of banks

• Banks must not mechanically rely on CRA ratings for assessing creditworthiness.
• Enhanced internal credit assessment is required, especially for large, sophisticated banks.
• Supervisors should incentivize the use of internal ratings-based approaches.
• Restrictions on CRA rating reliance may include capital requirements, portfolio limits, and asset-specific rules.

Principle III.3: Internal limits and investment policies of investment managers and institutional investors

• All investment managers and institutional investors must avoid mechanical reliance on CRA ratings.
• Public disclosure of credit assessment approaches and CRA usage is required.
• Senior management and boards should ensure that internal risk assessments are conducted and that investment managers are not reliant on CRA ratings.
• Regulatory regimes should support the development of internal risk assessment processes.

Principle III.4: Private sector margin agreements

• Market participants and central counterparties should not use CRA rating changes as automatic triggers for margin calls.
• Through-the-cycle initial margins and frequent variation margin payments should be used instead.
• Standardised derivatives should be cleared through central counterparties to reduce bilateral margining.

Principle III.5: Disclosures by issuers of securities

• Issuers should disclose comprehensive and timely information to help investors make independent assessments.
• Public disclosure is required for publicly-traded securities.
• Improved issuer disclosure can reduce reliance on CRA ratings by enhancing investor knowledge.

Next Steps

• The FSB will request standard setters and regulators to translate the principles into specific policy actions.
• These actions should consider market conditions, product types, and jurisdictional differences.
• International consistency and avoidance of regulatory arbitrage are important objectives.
• The FSB will report progress to G20 Finance Ministers and Governors in 2011.
• Collaboration and sharing of experiences among authorities will be encouraged to ensure effective implementation.