欧盟-核军备控制危机及其对欧洲安全的影响（英文）-2020.1-16页_422kb

Summary of "The Crisis of Nuclear Arms Control and Its Impact on European Security"

Core Content

This paper discusses the current crisis in the nuclear arms control system, which originated during the Cold War as a US-Soviet initiative. It highlights the impact of this crisis on European security and proposes options for the EU and its member states to become more actively involved in rethinking the nuclear arms control architecture.

Main Views

• Historical Context: Nuclear arms control emerged as a means to reduce the risk of war and manage the nuclear rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. It was primarily focused on strategic stability, reducing the likelihood of nuclear escalation and the costs of the arms race.
• EU's Role: The EU has not prioritized nuclear arms control as part of its agenda, and remains ill-equipped to engage in this domain. European states have generally supported arms control efforts, but concerns about whether these efforts align with European security interests persist.
• Key Treaties: The INF Treaty (1987) and New START (2010) are central to the post-Cold War nuclear arms control framework. The INF Treaty was terminated in 2019, while New START is set to expire in 2021.
• Strategic Stability: Arms control aimed to provide predictability, transparency, and restraint, thereby stabilizing the US-Russian relationship. However, the focus on strategic nuclear forces has left non-strategic weapons and emerging technologies largely unaddressed.
• Emerging Challenges: The crisis is influenced by technological advancements (e.g., cyber, hypersonic, AI, and space-based weapons), shifts in the international order (e.g., the rise of China), and the erosion of mutual trust between nuclear powers.

Key Information

• INF Treaty Collapse: The 2019 termination of the INF Treaty marked a significant setback in the nuclear arms control framework, leading to the resumption of intermediate-range missile development by both the US and Russia.
• New START: The treaty remains in force until 2021 and sets limits on strategic nuclear forces. It includes a verification system with on-site inspections, but does not address all aspects of nuclear modernization.
• Non-Strategic Weapons: These weapons, which are not covered by current treaties, pose a significant threat to European security due to their potential for rapid deployment and use in conflicts.
• NPT Article VI: The US and Russia are still bound by their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI, which requires disarmament, although this is not enforceable.
• European Concerns: European states have expressed concerns about the US-Russian focus on strategic arms control, fearing that it may not adequately address their security needs or that it could lead to strategic decoupling.

Impact on European Security

• Military Threats: The collapse of the INF Treaty and the resumption of intermediate-range missile development have reintroduced the risk of nuclear weapons being deployed in Europe.
• Security Dilemma: The absence of arms control frameworks may lead to increased mistrust and a security dilemma, potentially resulting in an arms race and the development of new nuclear and conventional capabilities.
• Peace Movements: Concerns about limited nuclear war and the risks associated with non-strategic weapons have driven European peace movements and calls for nuclear weapon-free zones.
• EU's Inaction: The EU has not taken a proactive stance in nuclear arms control, which limits its ability to influence the agenda and address emerging security challenges effectively.

Options for EU Engagement

• Continuation of New START: Extending the treaty or developing a similar agreement could maintain strategic stability, though it may not address all modern security concerns.
• Broadening the Scope: Proposals include expanding the scope of treaties to cover non-strategic weapons and new technologies, or creating a trilateral agreement involving China.
• Non-Treaty Frameworks: A shift towards non-treaty-based arms control could involve increased dialogue, voluntary restraint, and the development of 'rules of the road' to manage nuclear risks.
• Multilateral Approaches: A more inclusive and multilateral arms control system may be necessary to address the growing number of nuclear-armed states and the entanglement of nuclear and conventional capabilities.
• Institutional Reforms: The EU needs to develop a more structured and institutionalized approach to nuclear arms control to be an effective actor in the field.

Conclusion

The current crisis in nuclear arms control has significant implications for European security. While the EU has not yet taken a central role in addressing it, there is a need for a more proactive and comprehensive approach that reflects Europe's specific security concerns and adapts to the evolving strategic landscape.