2025-01-19-欧洲央行-当银行有所保留时_信贷和流动性准备金（英）_65页_1mb

Analysis of Banks' Reluctance to Use Central Bank Liquidity

Introduction

• Banks exhibit reluctance to borrow from central banks and use borrowed funds for lending, even during liquidity shortages.
• Stigma and market failures explain this behavior, leading to deficient bank intermediation.
• Credit easing (CE) and quantitative easing (QE) can stimulate lending through cheaper, more persistent liquidity.

Model Findings

Equilibria Comparison

1. Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR):

   • Central bank provides liquidity on market conditions.
   • Improves welfare compared to laissez-faire, but banks remain reluctant to borrow and lend sufficiently.
   • Banks ignore collective gains in atomistic decisions, leading to loan deficits and underinvestment.

2. Credit Easing (CE):

   • Central bank liberalizes liquidity provision at minimum market rates.
   • Aligns private allocations with social optimum under no externalities.
   • Fails to fully correct underinvestment when cross-sector externalities exist.

3. Quantitative Easing (QE):

   • Subsidized asset purchases complement CE, enabling convergence of private and social optima.
   • Reinforces the link between liquidity and credit, supporting aggregate activity.

Key Propositions

• Banks internalize externalities differently: Central banks can incentivize lending by adjusting liquidity terms, but underinvestment persists with externalities.
• Policy prescriptions dependent on regime: LOLR mitigates fire sales, CE promotes alignment, QE facilitates resource reallocation.

Empirical Analysis

Data Highlights

• No correlation between: Conventional refinancing facilities and bank lending.
• Strong correlation between: Non-borrowed reserves (QE/CE) and loan origination.
• Banks prioritize liquidity sources that foster lending, disregarding conventional reserves instrumented on market terms.

Econometric Results

• Instrumental variables address endogeneity: Results confirm loan boosts from non-borrowed reserves (≈1%–1.5% loan increase per unit of reserves).
• Risk-taking channel: CE/QE stimulate lending but do not correlate with zombie lending or inefficiency.

Conclusions

• Banks' borrowing reluctance stems from strategic considerations and stigma.
• CE and QE mechanisms rich central banks' balance sheets, enabling them to drive lending via disinflation and liquidity reassurance.
• Optimal monetary policy relies on governing liquidity supply tailored to escape loan deficits and stimulate real activity.