2017年-FSB全球金融稳定委员会_Guidance_on_Central_Counterparty_Resolution_and_Resolution_Planning_27页_320kb

Summary of Guidance on Central Counterparty Resolution and Resolution Planning

Introduction

This document provides guidance on the resolution and resolution planning of central counterparties (CCPs), aiming to support financial stability and ensure the continuity of critical financial market infrastructure (FMI) functions. It is developed by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), in collaboration with the Committee on Payments and Markets Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), to align with the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions and the FMI Annex. The guidance is not a replacement for these documents but complements them by offering implementation advice.

Core Content

1. Objectives of CCP Resolution and Resolution Planning

• Financial stability is the primary objective of CCP resolution.
• The resolution should ensure the continuity of critical CCP functions without exposing taxpayers to risk.
• It should maintain market and public confidence while minimising adverse contagion.
• The resolution authority should avoid disruptions in the operation of links between the CCP and other FMIs.
• Participants should maintain continuous access to collateral.

2. Resolution Authority and Resolution Powers

• The resolution authority should have powers to enforce contractual obligations, continue operations temporarily, return to a matched book, address default and non-default losses, write down equity and unsecured liabilities, convert unsecured liabilities into equity, and wind down non-critical functions.
• Forced allocation of open contracts should only occur if it is necessary to achieve resolution objectives and the authority has an explicit legal power to do so.
• Cash calls may be used to cover non-default losses, and they should be reserved for resolution.
• Initial margin write-down should only be used when necessary and not be bankruptcy-remote.
• The resolution authority should be able to replenish financial resources and compensate clearing members who contribute beyond their obligations.

3. Entry into Resolution

• A CCP should enter resolution if it is or is likely to be no longer viable or unable to meet legal and regulatory requirements.
• Resolution should be possible before all recovery measures are exhausted, especially if the CCP is unable to implement them effectively.
• Cooperation between authorities is essential to enable timely resolution actions.
• Indicators for triggering resolution include:
  • Inability to return to a matched book.
  • Exhaustion of loss allocation tools.
  • Failure to replenish financial resources.
  • Unwillingness of participants to contribute to recovery.
  • Delays in implementing recovery processes.

4. Allocating Losses to Equity Holders in Resolution

• Equity holders should absorb losses in resolution to the extent not already written down.
• Equity should be fully loss-absorbing in the case of default losses.
• For non-default losses, equity should be written down before losses are allocated to creditors.
• In cases of concurrent default and non-default losses, they should be allocated separately.

5. No Creditor Worse Off Safeguard

• The "no creditor worse off" (NCWO) safeguard ensures that participants, equity holders, and creditors do not suffer more in resolution than they would in liquidation.
• The counterfactual for NCWO should assume the full application of the CCP's rules and arrangements for loss allocation.
• The price of torn-up contracts should be based on a fair market price or other appropriate price discovery method.
• Statutory or contractual subordination may be used to protect operationally critical liabilities.

Key Points

• The guidance emphasizes international consistency and legal clarity.
• It outlines specific powers that resolution authorities should have to manage CCP resolution effectively.
• Communication and cooperation between relevant authorities are critical to resolution success.
• The NCWO safeguard is a key principle, ensuring fair treatment of creditors.
• Financial resource planning is essential to support the CCP's critical functions during resolution.

Conclusion

This guidance aims to provide a comprehensive framework for CCP resolution and planning, ensuring financial stability, market continuity, and fair treatment of stakeholders. It highlights the importance of legal frameworks, cooperation, and transparent processes in managing CCP resolution. The FSB will continue to review and potentially update this guidance based on further experience and analysis.