2017年-FSB全球金融稳定委员会_Peer_Review_of_Argentina_73页_868kb
报告摘要
Peer Review Summary of Argentina
Core Content
This document presents the findings and recommendations of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) peer review of Argentina, conducted in July 2017. The review focused on two key areas: the macroprudential policy framework and the framework for crisis management and resolution. It is based on responses from Argentine financial authorities and discussions in the FSB Standing Committee on Standards Implementation (SCSI), and aims to support Argentina in further developing its financial stability mechanisms in alignment with international standards.
Main Findings
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Macroprudential Policy Framework:
- Progress has been made in data collection and systemic risk analysis.
- A new draft bill has been submitted to Congress, enhancing the financial stability mandate for the National Securities Commission (CNV) and improving the framework for financial market infrastructures.
- The Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina (BCRA) has a broad mandate that includes financial stability, but this may conflict with other objectives such as monetary stability and economic development.
- The BCRA has introduced innovative tools in response to the 2001-02 crisis, such as restrictions on foreign currency lending.
- Stress testing is conducted annually by the BCRA and institutions under its supervision, but results are not comparable or aggregated, limiting the usefulness of the analysis.
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Crisis Management and Resolution Framework:
- Some progress has been made in incorporating elements of the FSB Key Attributes into the resolution regime.
- Recovery planning is underway for four of the five Domestic Systemically Important Banks (DSIBs), but resolution planning has not yet begun.
- The current resolution framework lacks alignment with the Key Attributes and is limited in several important areas, such as legal powers and funding mechanisms.
- The BCRA has limited powers to manage failing institutions, and the resolution process often involves court-appointed trustees.
Key Recommendations
Macroprudential Policy Framework
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Clarify BCRA's mandate:
- Review and revise the BCRA Charter to clarify the role of financial stability relative to other objectives.
- Consider establishing an internal financial stability committee.
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Enhance inter-agency coordination:
- Create a coordination forum involving sectoral regulators and relevant ministries to address regulatory gaps, share information, and develop crisis preparedness protocols.
- Ensure the forum supports the BCRA's leadership on financial stability without interfering with the independence of its regulatory authority members.
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Improve data collection:
- Develop a framework for identifying and collecting data relevant to systemic risk analysis, including non-bank financial institutions, corporate sector, real estate, and cross-border activities.
- Use information sharing arrangements among relevant authorities to enhance data quality and granularity.
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Refine stress testing:
- Reconcile bottom-up and top-down stress tests by using common scenarios.
- Publish more information on the objectives, methodology, and system-wide results of stress tests to improve transparency and public understanding.
Framework for Crisis Management and Resolution
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Incorporate Key Attributes:
- Introduce explicit powers to establish a temporary bridge institution.
- Ensure continuity of critical services during resolution.
- Allow replacement of senior management with professional managers from the private sector.
- Enhance legal protections for BCRA staff and extend them to other safety net officials, such as SEDESA.
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Strengthen institutional arrangements:
- Enhance the operational independence of the resolution function within the BCRA.
- Establish a clear statutory mandate for resolution to alleviate legal concerns and ensure effective implementation.
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Improve resolution funding:
- Clarify the use of SEDESA as a resolution funding mechanism through regulatory amendments or published strategies.
- Ensure the BCRA has a stronger role in resolution funding decisions by establishing a more independent decision-making process within the Steering Committee.
- Consider introducing more predictable and transparent back-up funding sources for SEDESA, with clear provisions for loss recovery from shareholders, unsecured creditors, or the financial system.
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Develop recovery and resolution planning:
- Initiate resolution planning as part of an iterative approach to Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRPs).
- Introduce powers to require financial institutions to adopt measures that enhance their resolvability, regardless of current financial health.
Key Information
- Peer Review Objectives: To assess the implementation and effectiveness of macroprudential and crisis resolution policies in Argentina.
- Review Period: Based on information as of April 2017.
- Review Team: Chaired by François Groepe (Deputy Governor, South African Reserve Bank) and including members from Banco de México, Reserve Bank of India, Central Bank of Brazil, and Bank of Spain.
- FSB Context: Peer reviews complement the FSAP cycle, which occurs every five years. Argentina's peer review was conducted in 2017, two to three years after its FSAP.
- Challenges: Limited institutional independence, lack of formal coordination mechanisms, and insufficient transparency in stress testing and resolution processes.
Conclusion
The peer review highlights Argentina's progress in financial stability initiatives, particularly in macroprudential policy and crisis resolution. However, it also identifies areas for improvement, including the need for stronger institutional frameworks, enhanced inter-agency cooperation, and more transparent and comprehensive data collection and stress testing practices. The recommendations aim to align Argentina's financial stability mechanisms with international standards and ensure resilience in the face of future macroeconomic and financial challenges.
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