2016年-FSB全球金融稳定委员会_Essential_Aspects_of_CCP_Resolution_Planning_27页_312kb

Summary of Essential Aspects of CCP Resolution Planning

Core Content

The Financial Stability Board (FSB), in collaboration with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), is seeking input on essential aspects of central counterparty (CCP) resolution planning. The goal is to ensure that CCPs, which are critical to financial stability due to their central role in clearing transactions, can be resolved without relying on government bailouts or causing contagion.

The discussion note outlines key areas for consideration in designing effective resolution strategies, including objectives, timing, financial resources, loss allocation, and cross-border coordination. The FSB aims to develop more detailed guidance by early 2017, based on the feedback received, and will continue to coordinate this work with other elements of the CCP workplan.

Main Points and Key Information

1. Objectives of CCP Resolution

• Financial stability and continuity: Resolution should aim to maintain the CCP's critical functions without exposing taxpayers to risk.
• Restoration and wind-down: Strategies should either restore the CCP's ability to operate as a going concern or ensure its functions are carried out by another entity with an orderly wind-down.
• Minimizing contagion and disruptions: Resolution should avoid negative impacts on participants, affiliates, and other financial market infrastructures (FMIs).

2. Resolution Strategies

• Scenarios to address: Strategies must cover default events, non-default events, and combinations of both.
• Tailored approaches: Each CCP should have a resolution plan that reflects its unique risks and systemic implications.
• Flexibility and credibility: Authorities should consider legal frameworks, resource availability, and the impact on stakeholder incentives.

3. Timing of Entry into Resolution

• Conditions for entry: Resolution should be triggered if recovery plans fail or if they risk financial stability.
• Presumptive timing: Authorities may define a presumptive timing (e.g., after auction failure or waterfall exhaustion) to provide predictability.
• Balancing flexibility and transparency: While some flexibility is needed, disclosure of presumptive timing can enhance market confidence and encourage recovery efforts.

4. Adequacy of Financial Resources in Resolution

• Resource evaluation: Authorities must assess the financial resources needed to address uncovered losses, replenish capital, and maintain critical functions.
• Pre-funded vs. ex-post resources: Additional pre-funded resources can enhance resolution credibility and reduce reliance on public funds.
• Proportionality and opportunity cost: The amount of resources should be appropriately sized, considering the CCP's risk profile and the cost to stakeholders.

5. Tools to Return to a Matched Book

• Tools available: Include forced allocation, tear-up of contracts, and voluntary measures like auctions or direct sales.
• Tool selection: Resolution authorities should choose tools based on their ability to restore the CCP's matched book and minimize systemic risks.
• Ownership and control: Consideration of temporary control, ownership changes, or bridge CCPs may be necessary for continuity.

6. Allocation of Losses in Resolution

• Default and non-default losses: Different tools and approaches may be needed for each type of loss.
• Pari passu treatment: Resolution authorities should generally treat creditors equally, but flexibility may be required to manage systemic risks.
• NCWO safeguard: The "no creditor worse off" principle must be applied to ensure that resolution does not lead to worse outcomes than insolvency.

7. Non-Default Losses

• Allocation considerations: Non-default losses should be managed through mechanisms that prevent unnecessary disruption.
• Distinct from default scenarios: Resolution in non-default contexts may require different approaches, such as addressing operational or legal failures.

8. Cross-Border Cooperation

• Crisis Management Groups (CMGs): These groups should be composed of relevant resolution authorities and may need to include additional members on an ad-hoc basis.
• Transparency and coordination: Resolution strategies should be disclosed to enhance transparency and cross-border enforceability.
• Legal and operational challenges: Coordination across jurisdictions is essential to avoid disruptions and ensure effective resolution actions.

9. Cross-Border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions

• Suspension of clearing mandates: This could be a tool to manage cross-border risks, but its execution must be carefully considered.
• Coordination and enforceability: Ensuring that resolution actions are effective across borders requires clear rules and cooperation among authorities.

Conclusion

The FSB is seeking feedback on various aspects of CCP resolution planning to ensure that resolution strategies are effective, credible, and do not lead to "too big to fail" situations. The discussion note highlights the importance of balancing financial stability, market confidence, and stakeholder incentives. It also emphasizes the need for cross-border cooperation and the development of clear, flexible, and proportionate resolution tools and strategies.