IMF-央行数字货币与金融普惠（英）-2023.3-50页_1mb

Central Bank Digital Currency and Financial Inclusion Summary

Key Motivations for CBDC Issuance

Central banks globally are exploring central bank digital currency (CBDC) issuance. Motivations vary but include maintaining monetary sovereignty, combating illicit money use, encouraging competition in e-money, and improving payment efficiency (especially in advanced economies). Among emerging market and low-income economies, boosting financial inclusion stands out as a primary motivation.

Concerns Regarding CBDC Impact

A major concern in CBDC discussions is the potential risk of bank disintermediation and reduction in overall credit supply if bank deposits quickly flow into CBDC accounts. However, the paper argues that CBDCs also present opportunities, particularly in developing countries.

CBDC Potential in Developing Countries

The paper highlights the unique potential of CBDCs in developing nations:

• Opportunity to bank large unbanked populations
• Boost financial inclusion, increasing lending and reducing bank disintermediation risks

Model Framework & Key Channels

Two primary channels through which CBDC impacts financial inclusion and welfare:

1. Increases bank deposits from previously unbanked populations by incentivizing bank account openings for CBDC wallet access
2. Enables credit building through CBDC usage data, reducing credit-risk information asymmetry in lending

Conditions for Positive Impact

CBDC can positively impact overall lending under specific conditions:

1. Low bank deposit liquidity risk (disintermediation risk)
2. Large unbanked population with significant relative wealth
3. Value of CBDC as a payment means or for credit-building

Welfare Impact Despite Reduced Lending

Even when overall lending decreases, CBDC can improve household welfare through:

• Value from payments convenience
• Provision of an "alternative safe savings vehicle
• Greater surplus in lending by reducing credit-risk information asymmetry

CBDC Design Alternatives

The paper explores different CBDC distribution models:

• Traditional two-tier model: Central banks issue to commercial banks who distribute to consumers
• Alternative model allowing non-bank payment providers to distribute CBDC
• Policy choices regarding CBDC remittance design

Conclusion

The paper concludes that:

• CBDC issuance increases financial inclusion but presents a trade-off between payments inclusion and banking system inclusion
• Optimal CBDC design must balance greater access to CBDC with maintaining lending supply
• In many contexts, complementary policies are needed alongside CBDC implementation