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Summary of RAND Europe's Evidence Submission on Undersea Cables

Core Content

This document provides RAND Europe's submission of evidence to the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, focusing on the security, resilience, and strategic implications of undersea cable infrastructure (CUI) for the UK and its allies. It outlines the current and future state of CUI, identifies key threat actors, and discusses the technological and policy challenges associated with its protection.

Main Points

1. Evolution of UK's Reliance on Undersea Cables

• Undersea cables carry 97% of global telecommunications and are essential for £8 trillion in daily financial transactions.
• The UK's reliance on undersea cables is expected to increase significantly over the next 10–15 years due to the digitalisation of its economy and society.
• While satellite communications offer some alternatives, they cannot match the bandwidth of undersea cables.
• The UK's geographic position and existing infrastructure make it a strategic hub for transatlantic and North Sea cables.

2. Key Vulnerabilities of Undersea Infrastructure

• Undersea infrastructure is widely spread and difficult to monitor, especially with crewed naval assets.
• Publicly accessible data on cable locations and characteristics makes them vulnerable to targeted attacks.
• Stakeholder fragmentation across public and private sectors and multiple jurisdictions hinders coordination.
• Lack of standardisation and increasing automation create new dependencies and cyber vulnerabilities.
• Natural disasters and accidents (e.g., fishing, anchor dragging) are the most common causes of disruption.
• Legal ambiguities exist for infrastructure located beyond 12 nautical miles of territorial waters.
• Limited capacity of specialist ships and equipment to inspect, repair, and replace cables poses a risk in case of multiple simultaneous disruptions.

3. Threat Actors and Their Capabilities

• Deliberate disruptions remain relatively rare, but accidents and natural hazards account for a large portion of known incidents.
• State actors like Russia and China are the most capable of deliberate attacks on CUI.
  • Russia has specialised naval and intelligence assets and submarine capabilities.
  • China has invested in European infrastructure companies, raising security concerns.
• Non-state actors, including hackers, terrorists, and criminals, are also a growing threat due to increasing access to technology.
• Uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) and cyber-attacks are becoming more accessible and pose new risks.
• Grey zone tactics are well-suited to the undersea domain due to plausible deniability and difficulty in attribution.

4. Developments in Subsea Technologies

• The digital revolution will drive significant growth in undersea cable infrastructure, electricity interconnectors, and oil and gas pipelines.
• Automation and digitisation increase efficiency but also cyber vulnerabilities.
• Uncrewed systems and AI are being developed to monitor and protect CUI, but they can also be used for offensive purposes.
• Renewable energy initiatives will increase the number of undersea power cables, especially for offshore wind and hydrogen transport.
• New technologies can be used for both defensive and offensive purposes, depending on intent and context.

5. Resilience of UK Public and Private Sectors

• A large, coordinated disruption could have severe impacts on finance, communications, government, and essential services.
• The resilience of the system depends on built-in redundancy and the speed and effectiveness of response.
• Military assets like surveillance aircraft, submarines, and MROS ships are critical for CUI protection, but funding and staffing issues hinder their effectiveness.
• The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and NATO's MARCOM have been effective in enhancing situational awareness and coordinating responses to CUI threats.

6. Policy and Coordination Across Whitehall and the Private Sector

• Responsibilities for CUI are spread across multiple departments, creating coordination challenges.
• The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) leads policy for undersea cables, while DESNZ oversees electricity interconnectors.
• Information sharing is crucial for effective security and resilience but is often challenging to achieve.
• International cooperation, especially with France, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, and Ireland, is essential.
• The UK's involvement in JEF and NATO is vital for collective security and response coordination.

7. Balancing Domestic Resilience and Detection/Interdiction

• Crewed naval assets are limited and costly to deploy, making them less effective for long-term CUI protection.
• Uncrewed systems, AI, and advanced sensors are more sustainable and efficient options.
• The private sector must take a duty of care in protecting CUI, with security by design principles.
• No clear long-term alternatives exist to undersea cables, despite satellite and other technologies.
• Cyber and military threats are increasing, requiring comprehensive and integrated approaches to CUI protection.

Key Information

• Undersea cables are the primary means of global telecommunications and financial connectivity.
• Threats to CUI include accidents, natural hazards, state and non-state actors, with Russia and China being the most significant state threats.
• Technological advancements in UUVs, AI, and remote monitoring are transforming CUI, but also increasing security risks.
• The UK's strategic position in the North Atlantic and North Sea makes it a key player in subsea infrastructure.
• Inter-agency and international cooperation is essential for effective CUI protection.
• Policy fragmentation and lack of coordination are major challenges in securing CUI.
• Private sector responsibility is increasingly important, especially in designing and securing new infrastructure.