2009年-世界发展银行全球_Contingent_Liability_Risks_from_State-Owned_Enterprises_5页_812kb
报告摘要
Contingent Liability Risks from State-Owned Enterprises Summary
Core Content
This document outlines the key principles and strategies for addressing contingent liability risks arising from poorly performing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and parastatals, particularly in the context of a financial crisis. It provides technical advice from the World Bank's Global Expert Team on Public Sector Performance (PSP GET) to help governments manage these risks more effectively and transparently.
The focus is on improving public financial management and corporate governance to reduce the fiscal burden and build market confidence. The advice emphasizes the need for comprehensive risk assessment, transparent governance structures, and clear mechanisms for monitoring and recording contingent liabilities.
Main Views and Key Information
1. Understanding the Problem
- Governments must first understand the scale and nature of contingent liabilities from SOEs.
- Conducting an inventory of SOEs, their assets, and liabilities is essential to identify those with uncertain or speculative values.
- Particular attention should be given to sectors such as banking and real estate, which often lack proper oversight.
2. Classification of Risks
- Establish low and high-end estimates for fiscal risks.
- Identify and classify different types of contingent liabilities to better understand their potential impact on public finances.
3. Reform Strategies
- Reform strategies should be tailored to each SOE based on its specific context and performance.
- Options include integrating SOEs into the budget, placing them under a holding company, or ensuring regular audits of their financial status.
Key Principles
PRINCIPLE 1: Know the nature and scope of the problem
- Inventory SOEs: Conduct a thorough review of all state-owned enterprises and parastatals.
- Assess capacity: Evaluate the country's debt management capabilities, including structure, staff training, and performance targets.
- Identify oversight gaps: Recognize that SOEs can be created without proper oversight, leading to increased risks.
PRINCIPLE 2: Put in place viable arms' length governance principles for SOEs
- Transparent governance: Ensure SOEs operate independently from the government.
- Standardized accounting: Apply consistent accounting standards (e.g., IPSAS/IFAC) and require regular financial reporting and auditing.
- Treasury oversight: Establish a dedicated unit in the treasury for monitoring SOE finances and intervening early to prevent financial distress.
- Quasi-fiscal activity: Include SOE quasi-fiscal activities in the annual budget, such as subsidies and guarantees, to ensure transparency and risk assessment.
PRINCIPLE 3: Create transparent arrangements for loan guarantees
- Budget annex: Disclose all loan guarantees in an annex to the budget.
- Specify details: Include information on the beneficiary, lending institution, annual payment amounts, and the purpose of the guarantee.
- Risk estimation: Use historical data to estimate default rates and assess sector-specific and time-based liquidity exposure.
- Value guarantees: Apply valuation methodologies (e.g., simulation) to estimate the value of guarantees, and eventually include a contingency in the budget.
PRINCIPLE 4: Incorporate fiscal risk assessment into policy discussions and budgeting processes
- Track key indicators: Develop tracking mechanisms to monitor fiscal risks and provide timely data for policy formulation.
- Set ex ante limits: Establish limits on guarantees based on fiscal conditions and resource estimates during the budgeting process.
- Transparency in reporting: Record and disclose contingent liabilities, especially those of known contractual nature, in all their detail.
- Build market confidence: Include discussions on contingent liabilities in early policy documents to reassure financial markets.
Further Reading and References
- Cebotari, Aliona – Contingent Liabilities: Issues and Practice (October 2008), IMF Working Papers
- Flanagan, Mark J. – Resolving a Large Contingent Fiscal Liability: Eastern Europe Experience (July 2008), IMF Working Papers
- Polackova, Hana and Allen Schick – Government at Risk: Contingent Liabilities and Fiscal Risk (2002), World Bank, Oxford University Press
- Polackova, Hana – Contingent Government Liabilities: A Hidden Risk for Fiscal Stability (October 1998), World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1989
- World Bank – PREM Note: Contingent Liabilities - a threat to fiscal stability (November 1998)
Selected Experts
- Jim Brumby – Lead Public Sector Specialist, PRMPS
- Bill Dorotinsky – Lead Public Sector Specialist, ECSPE
- Salvatore Schiavo-Campo – Consultant
- Robert Beschel – Lead Public Sector Specialist, MNSED
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