2013年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_The_Impact_of_Turkeys_Membership_on_EU_Voting_13页_128kb

Summary of "The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU Voting"

Core Content

This policy brief by Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgrén analyzes the implications of Turkey's membership in the EU on the decision-making process, particularly focusing on the EU's "capacity to act" and the distribution of voting power among member states. The study compares the impact of two voting rule frameworks: the Treaty of Nice (Nice rules) and the Constitutional Treaty (CT rules).

Main Points

1. Voting Rule Reforms

• The Treaty of Nice (2001) and the Constitutional Treaty (2004) introduced significant changes to the EU Council of Ministers' voting procedures.
• The Nice rules require a 72.2% vote threshold, at least 13 member states, and 62% of the EU population for a winning coalition.
• The CT rules, which are more complex, require a double majority: 55% of member states and 65% of the EU population.

2. Impact on EU's Capacity to Act

• Under the CT rules, the EU's capacity to act is not significantly affected by enlargement to 29 members, including Turkey.
• Under the Nice rules, the EU's capacity to act is expected to be substantially reduced, as the rules are less efficient.
• The passage probability (likelihood of a random proposal passing) under the CT rules is higher than under the Nice rules, indicating better decision-making efficiency.

3. Power Distribution Among Member States

• Under the CT rules, Turkey is projected to be the second-most powerful member state in the EU-29, with greater influence than France, Italy, and the UK.
• Under the Nice rules, the power differences among countries with populations over 50 million are minimal, which suggests a more balanced distribution of power.
• The Normalised Banzhaf Index (NBI) and Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI) are used to measure the influence of member states. These indices show that power distribution varies significantly depending on the voting rules in place.

4. Impact of Enlargement on EU-25 Countries

• Under the CT rules, enlargement leads to a relatively even power distribution, with Germany losing the most.
• Under the Nice rules, the power loss is more uneven, with larger countries losing more.
• For smaller countries, the impact is ambiguous depending on the index used. The NBI suggests gains for some small states, while the SSI suggests small losses.

Key Findings

• Turkey's membership has a significant impact on the power distribution in the EU, especially under the CT rules.
• The CT rules improve the EU's ability to act compared to the Nice rules, even after enlargement.
• The acceptability of the CT or Turkey's membership may be affected by the power shift they bring.
• The passage probability under the CT rules is higher than under the Nice rules, indicating better decision-making efficiency.
• The CT rules are more politically acceptable for the EU's leading members than the Nice rules, especially in the context of enlargement.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that the EU's capacity to act is not significantly reduced by enlargement if the CT rules are implemented. However, under the Nice rules, enlargement would cripple the EU's decision-making. Turkey's membership would substantially alter the power dynamics, making it one of the most influential members under the CT rules. These findings highlight the importance of the voting rules in shaping the EU's future governance and political acceptability.