2014年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_The_Draft_Constitutional_Treatys_Voting_Reform_Dilemma_20页_1mb

Summary of "THE DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY'S VOTING REFORM DILEMMA"

Core Content

This policy brief by Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgren analyzes the voting reform dilemma in the context of the Draft Constitutional Treaty (DCT) and the Nice Treaty. The authors use voting game theory to evaluate the efficiency and power distribution implications of different voting systems. The main issue is that the DCT's proposed double-majority voting rule (60-50) is politically unacceptable to many EU members, particularly Spain and Poland, due to its concentration of power in the hands of the "Big-four" (Germany, France, UK, Italy). The fallback option, the Nice Treaty's triple-majority system, is also inefficient and unfair, especially for small and medium-sized states. The brief explores alternative voting rules that could resolve this dilemma.

Main Views

• The Nice Treaty's voting reforms are inefficient and unfair, especially for small states. They reduce the EU's capacity to act significantly compared to the EU15 system.
• The Giscard d'Estaing's 60-50 voting rule further concentrates power in the hands of the Big-four and is likely to fail due to political resistance.
• Dual-majority systems offer a better alternative. They allow for more efficient decision-making while distributing power more fairly than the Nice system.
• The 50-50 dual-majority rule is the most efficient and fair option, as it maintains a high passage probability and minimizes power shifts between member states.
• The 60-60 dual-majority rule also improves efficiency compared to the Nice system and is less biased than the 60-50 rule.
• The 50-60 dual-majority rule shifts power from large to small states, which may be politically appealing to Spain and Poland.

Key Information

Voting Game Theory Tools Used

• Passage Probability: Measures the likelihood that a randomly proposed issue would be approved. It is a proxy for the EU's decision-making efficiency.
• Normalised Banzhaf Index (NBI): Quantifies the power of a nation in the Council, indicating how often it can break a winning coalition on a random issue.

Efficiency of Voting Rules

• The Nice system reduces passage probability to 2.1% in the EU27, far below the EU15's level.
• The 50-50 dual-majority rule has a passage probability higher than Giscard's 60-50 and is more efficient than the Nice system.
• The 60-60 dual-majority rule has a passage probability of 14.1% in the EU27, which is four times higher than the Nice system.
• Adding Turkey to the EU increases the passage probability slightly, but does not significantly affect efficiency.

Power Distribution Impacts

• The Nice reforms increase the power of the Big-four and reduce the power of Spain and Poland, which are among the medium-sized states.
• The Giscard system (60-50) shifts more power to the Big-four than the Nice system.
• The 50-50 rule minimizes power shifts, making it the most politically acceptable option for small and medium-sized states.
• The 60-60 rule is a middle ground that increases efficiency without excessively shifting power to the Big-four.
• The 50-60 rule shifts power from large to small states, which could be more favorable to Spain and Poland.

Proposed Solutions

1. Modify Giscard's 60-50 system to 60-60 or 50-50 to increase efficiency and reduce power concentration.
2. Repair the Nice system by lowering the vote threshold to two-thirds and the population threshold to 50%, which would restore efficiency without significantly altering power distribution.
3. Consider the 50-50 rule as the best option for the EU's future, especially with potential enlargement, due to its member-invariance and high efficiency.

Implications of Turkey's Membership

• Turkey's inclusion slightly improves the passage probability under the 60-60 rule, but has a larger impact on power distribution, particularly reducing the power of large states like Germany and France.
• The NBI shows that Turkey's membership affects the power dynamics, especially under the Nice system.

Conclusion

The authors argue that the EU must adopt a dual-majority voting system that balances efficiency and fairness. The 50-50 or 60-60 rules are the most promising options, as they allow the EU to function effectively without disproportionately empowering the largest states. The Nice system is too inefficient and unfair to be viable, and any reform must consider both the current and future enlargement scenarios.