2012年-FSB全球金融稳定委员会_Global_Shadow_Banking_Monitoring_Report_2012_45页_1mb

Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2012 Summary

Core Content

The Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2012 provides an analysis of the size, structure, and risks associated with the shadow banking system, defined as credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system. The report outlines the methodology and findings of the second annual monitoring exercise conducted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which expanded its coverage to 25 jurisdictions and the euro area, representing 86% of global GDP and 90% of global financial system assets.

Main Findings

• Growth Trends: The shadow banking system, as measured by "Other Financial Intermediaries" (OFIs), grew rapidly before the financial crisis, increasing from $26 trillion in 2002 to $62 trillion in 2007, then slightly declined in 2008 before rising to $67 trillion in 2011, equivalent to 111% of global GDP.
• Global Share: The shadow banking system accounts for ~25% of total financial intermediation in the global financial system, a decrease from its peak of 27% in 2007.
• Jurisdictional Differences:
  • The US has the largest shadow banking system with $23 trillion in assets, followed by the euro area ($22 trillion) and the UK ($9 trillion).
  • The US share of the global shadow banking system declined from 44% in 2005 to 35% in 2011, while the UK and euro area saw increases.
  • Jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, the Netherlands, the UK, Singapore, and Switzerland have a relatively high share of non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) in relation to GDP.
• Regional Variations:
  • Advanced economies (e.g., US, UK, euro area) have a higher share of NBFIs in their financial systems.
  • Emerging and developing economies (e.g., India, Indonesia, China) have a lower share of NBFIs, but some have experienced rapid growth in their NBFI sectors.
• Post-Crisis Trends:
  • The shadow banking system grew in 17 jurisdictions and contracted in 8 during 2008–2011.
  • Securitisation markets and Money Market Funds (MMFs) were particularly affected, with MMFs suffering due to low interest rates.
  • Derivative assets and liabilities increased significantly in the UK and Switzerland, aligned with global trends in OTC derivatives.

Key Risk Factors

• Interconnectedness: Shadow banking entities are more dependent on bank funding and heavily invested in bank assets, making them more vulnerable than banks.
• Systemic Risks: The report highlights the importance of monitoring maturity/liquidity transformation, leverage, and imperfect credit risk transfer.
• Regulatory Arbitrage: Some jurisdictions have noted the potential for regulatory arbitrage within the NBFI sector, which could undermine financial regulation.

Finance Companies

• A survey of 25 jurisdictions indicates a diverse range of business models for finance companies, which are non-banks providing loans to other entities.
• Finance companies play a key role in credit provision, especially in filling credit voids not covered by traditional banks.
• Although they contribute to the shadow banking system, systemic risks are not currently seen as significant due to the limited size of the sector.
• Monitoring is still considered important to address specific risk factors and regulatory arbitrage.

Methodology

• The FSB used a two-step approach:
  1. Macro-mapping: Broader data collection on all non-bank financial intermediation to identify potential risk areas.
  2. Narrowing focus: Analysis of specific risk factors (e.g., maturity transformation, leverage) and regulatory arbitrage.
• Flow of Funds data were used as the primary source, with qualitative information and market intelligence supplementing the analysis.
• OFIs are used as a conservative proxy for shadow banking, though they may include entities not engaged in credit intermediation.

Data and Monitoring Challenges

• Data Limitations: Some jurisdictions, such as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, lack fully developed Flow of Funds statistics.
• Granularity Issues: The unidentified component in the OFI sector is ~36% in some countries, but has decreased to ~18% in 2012 due to improved data.
• Future Improvements:
  • Enhanced data availability and granularity is essential.
  • The FSB recommends activity-based monitoring and supervisory information to better capture risks.
  • Surveys and market estimates can be used where Flow of Funds data are insufficient, particularly for entities like hedge funds.

Recommendations

• Flexibility and Adaptability: The monitoring framework should remain flexible and forward-looking to address innovations and mutations in the shadow banking system.
• Cross-Border Data: Improved cross-border and prudential data will help in assessing interconnectedness and systemic risks.
• Regulatory Tools: The FSB Workstream on securities lending and repos (WS5) is expected to contribute to transparency and data collection efforts.

Conclusion

The 2012 monitoring exercise highlights the complex and evolving nature of the shadow banking system, with significant differences in structure, growth, and risk exposure across jurisdictions. While the sector is not currently seen as a major source of systemic risk, the need for improved monitoring and regulatory oversight remains crucial to prevent future risks. Continued data enhancement and policy development are recommended to ensure effective oversight of the shadow banking system.