2006年-世界发展银行全球_Deposit_Insurance_and_Banking_Reform_in_Russia_23页_368kb

报告摘要

Summary of "Deposit Insurance and Banking Reform in Russia"

Core Content

This paper examines the adoption of a deposit insurance system (DIS) in Russia in late 2003 and its implications for the stability and development of the Russian banking system. The focus is on the rationale for the system, its implementation, and the challenges and potential risks it introduces.

Main Objectives

To analyze the rationale and impact of the Russian DIS.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the system in enhancing banking stability and development.
To highlight the lessons learned from the implementation process and the structural issues in the Russian banking sector.

Key Rationale for the DIS

Public Confidence: Enhancing trust in financial institutions and supporting financial and macroeconomic stability.
Protection of Small Depositors: Ensuring that smaller depositors are not disproportionately affected by bank failures.
Leveling the Playing Field: Encouraging competition between state-owned and private banks by reducing the informational asymmetry that previously favored state banks.
Financial Deepening: Improving access to finance by re-intermediating savings into the domestic banking system.

Key Features of the Russian DIS

Legal Framework and Structural Design

Established by Federal Law No. 177-FZ of December 23, 2003.
The Russian Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) was created in January 2004 as an independent entity.
The DIA is governed by a 13-member Board, comprising 7 government representatives, 5 CBR officials, and a Director General.
Insurance Premium: Uniform for all banks, payable quarterly in rubles, based on daily averages of insured deposits.
Premium Limit: Cannot exceed 0.15% of deposits in the last accounting period, and is expected to reduce to 0.05% once the fund reaches 5% of the deposit base.
Coverage: Full coverage up to 100,000 RUR (about US$3,500) for individual deposits, without indexation.
Foreign Currency Deposits: Covered up to the equivalent in RUR, converted at the CBR-determined exchange rate.
Exclusion: Sberbank, the largest retail bank, was initially excluded from the DIS but will join on January 1, 2007.

Participation

The DIS is compulsory and automatic for natural persons' deposits (excluding corporate, bearer, trust, and offshore deposits).
870 out of 1,097 banks collecting private deposits participated in the DIS as of 2005.
931 banks were admitted to the DIS by January 2006, though some not accepted continued to take private deposits.

Fund Composition

The initial capital was 2 billion RUR, provided by the Russian Government.
By 2005, the fund had grown to 16.6 billion RUR, representing 0.6% of the individual deposit base.
Insurance premiums contributed 59%, with the rest coming from government contributions and investment income.

Market Trends and Banking Structure

Concentration and Fragmentation: The Russian banking system is highly concentrated at the top and fragmented in the middle and bottom, with a strong focus on the Moscow-St. Petersburg corridor.
Market Share: Sberbank holds 54.1% of retail deposits and about one-third of total loans.
Private Banks: Despite growth, private banks still hold only 23% of the population's bank accounts.
Branch Networks: Russian banks have a low level of branch penetration, with an average of 2.6 branches per institution and 43,642 people per branch.
Deposit Growth: Private deposits have grown strongly, but at a slower rate than previous years. Growth has been more pronounced in regional banks outside Moscow.
Interest Rates: Real interest rates on deposits remain negative for all maturities, and interest rate spreads have not changed significantly since 2003.

Challenges and Risks

Moral Hazard: The DIS may encourage risk-taking by banks, as they could substitute deposit insurance for capital.
Weakness of Banks: Many Russian banks are weak and potentially vulnerable, with low loan quality, poor governance, and high credit risks (about 70% of the loan portfolio).
Non-Performing Loans: Despite growth in loan portfolios, non-performing loans are underestimated, and loan loss provisions are low at 5%.
Systemic Risks: The volatility of the banking system and limited regulatory tools pose systemic risks, especially if the DIS is applied to weak institutions.
Contagion Risk: The 2004 mini-crisis highlighted the contagion effect and liquidity risks in the system.

Lessons from Implementation

The DIS was introduced despite significant resistance from industry groups and concerns about contingent liabilities.
Proper sequencing of reforms is crucial, and the CBR's enforcement capabilities should be strengthened before introducing DIS.
The initial exclusion of Sberbank was strategic, given its dominant market position, but its inclusion in 2007 could level the playing field.
The 2004 crisis demonstrated the need for strong communication and coordinated action to prevent systemic panic.
Blanket guarantees may be effective in crisis, but should be temporary and not a long-term solution.

Conclusion

The Russian DIS is a key reform aimed at enhancing stability and competition in the banking sector. However, its effectiveness is limited by structural weaknesses, low branch penetration, and poor governance. The implementation process and sequencing of reforms are critical factors in the system's success. While the DIS has helped improve public confidence, it must be complemented by stronger regulatory frameworks and enhanced enforcement capabilities to prevent moral hazard and systemic instability.