2016年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_Brexit_and_the_Distribution_of_Power_in_the_Council_of_the_EU_4页_470kb
报告摘要
Brexit and the Distribution of Power in the Council of the EU
Core Content
This document discusses the impact of Brexit on the distribution of power within the Council of the EU, focusing on the Banzhaf power index, which measures a country's influence in a voting system. It highlights how the double majority rule—requiring 55% of member states and 65% of the population—can lead to unexpected shifts in voting power when a member state leaves or joins the EU.
Main Points
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Voting System Overview: The Council of the EU uses a double majority rule, where a proposal needs approval from both a majority of member states and a majority of the EU population.
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Impact of Brexit: When the UK leaves the EU, the relative influence of member states changes. Smaller countries tend to lose power, while larger states gain it. This contradicts the intuitive expectation that leaving would increase the influence of remaining members.
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Counter-Intuitive Effects: The loss of power for small states and gain for large ones is due to the way the voting system is structured. The Banzhaf index reveals that the UK's departure redistributes voting power in a way that larger states benefit more, even though they had a smaller population share than the UK.
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Potential Scenario with Scotland: If Scotland joins the EU in place of the UK, the power dynamics shift again. This time, larger states lose power, and smaller states gain it, which is the opposite of the Brexit scenario.
Key Findings
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Banzhaf Power Index: A quantitative measure of a country's influence in the Council. It calculates how often a country's vote is decisive in reaching a majority decision.
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UK's Role: The UK, despite being a large country, had a relatively low Banzhaf index (8.3%) before Brexit. After Brexit, its influence is removed, leading to a redistribution of power.
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Scotland's Potential Entry: If Scotland joins the EU, it would significantly increase the voting power of smaller states. For example, Ireland, Croatia, and others would see a substantial increase in their Banzhaf index, while Germany, France, and others would lose power.
Summary of Changes in Power Distribution
| Country | Brexit Impact (%) | Scotland Impact (%) | Total Impact (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | +16.6 | -9.6 | +5.4 |
| France | +18.0 | -9.1 | +7.2 |
| Italy | +17.1 | -8.9 | +6.6 |
| Spain | +23.3 | -7.9 | +13.6 |
| Poland | +28.8 | -8.1 | +18.4 |
| Romania | +5.7 | -3.4 | +2.1 |
| Netherlands | +5.6 | -2.4 | +3.1 |
| Belgium | +4.0 | +0.0 | +4.0 |
| Greece | +3.9 | +0.1 | +4.0 |
| Czechia | +3.7 | +0.4 | +4.1 |
| Portugal | +3.6 | +0.4 | +4.1 |
| Hungary | +3.4 | +0.8 | +4.2 |
| Sweden | +3.3 | +0.9 | +4.2 |
| Austria | +2.7 | +1.6 | +4.3 |
| Bulgaria | +1.9 | +2.6 | +4.5 |
| Denmark | +0.8 | +3.9 | +4.7 |
| Finland | +0.7 | +4.1 | +4.8 |
| Slovakia | +0.6 | +4.1 | +4.8 |
| Ireland | +0.0 | +4.9 | +4.9 |
| Croatia | -0.3 | +5.3 | +5.0 |
| Lithuania | -1.5 | +6.8 | +5.2 |
| Slovenia | -2.4 | +7.9 | +5.4 |
| Latvia | -2.4 | +8.0 | +5.4 |
| Estonia | -3.2 | +9.0 | +5.5 |
| Cyprus | -3.8 | +9.7 | +5.6 |
| Luxembourg | -4.1 | +10.2 | +5.7 |
| Malta | -4.3 | +10.4 | +5.7 |
Conclusion
The document emphasizes that the complexity of the Council's voting system can lead to non-intuitive outcomes in terms of power distribution. While Brexit may seem like it would increase the power of remaining member states, it actually results in larger states gaining more influence and smaller states losing power. Conversely, if Scotland joins the EU, the trend reverses, with larger states losing power and smaller states gaining it. These findings highlight the importance of understanding the mechanics of the voting system when assessing the political consequences of EU membership changes.
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