欧洲半导体：产业政策的回归（英）-蒙田研究所-2022.3-30页_391kb

Summary of "Semiconductors in Europe: the return of industrial policy"

Core Content

This policy paper examines the evolving role of industrial policy in the European semiconductor sector, highlighting the shift from traditional free-market principles to a more interventionist approach in response to global challenges. It outlines the strategic importance of semiconductors for Europe's digital and green transformation, as well as the risks posed by geopolitical tensions and supply chain vulnerabilities.

Main Points

1. Europe's Turn Towards Industrial Policy

• The European Union (EU) has historically favored open markets and limited direct state intervention in industry.
• However, recent geopolitical events and the semiconductor supply chain crisis have prompted a reconsideration of this stance.
• The EU is now adopting a more active industrial policy to secure its technological sovereignty and competitiveness.

2. The Semiconductor Sector in Perspective

• Europe's share of global semiconductor production capacity has dropped from 24% in 2000 to 8% in 2021.
• The sector is vital for the automotive, medical, and digital industries, with significant economic impacts from supply shortages.
• The 2020-2021 chip crisis caused an estimated USD 210 billion loss in the global automotive industry, with Europe being particularly affected.

3. Strengths and Weaknesses of the European Semiconductor Ecosystem

• Strengths:

  • Leading companies in sensors, power electronics, and design (STMicroelectronics, Infineon, NXP).
  • Strong presence in semiconductor equipment (ASML), materials (BASF), and design automation (Siemens EDA).
  • Advanced R&D capabilities in nanoelectronics, with institutions like CEA-Leti, IMEC, and Fraunhofer.
  • European leadership in FDSOI technology, which reduces energy consumption.
  • A significant market for semiconductor equipment, especially in the automotive and aeronautics sectors.

• Weaknesses:

  • Lack of world-leading fabless firms and advanced node foundries.
  • European companies are predominantly IDMs (Integrated Device Manufacturers) rather than contract foundries.
  • The absence of a European foundry capable of producing chips at the most advanced nodes (7nm and below) limits innovation and competitiveness.
  • Reliance on foreign suppliers for critical components, especially from East Asia and the US, raises concerns about supply chain resilience.

4. European Policy Instruments

• EU Chips Act (2022):

  • Introduces a new competition regime to enable State aid for the semiconductor industry.
  • Aims to boost Europe's share of global semiconductor production to 20% by 2030.
  • Includes provisions for "first-of-a-kind" technologies and supply chain security.

• Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI):

  • A funding mechanism for research, innovation, and pilot production.
  • The second IPCEI is expected to be announced in mid-2022 to support nanoelectronics.
  • The first IPCEI supported ASML's EUV lithography development.

• Next Generation EU (NGEU):

  • A recovery fund that supports investment in semiconductor manufacturing and innovation.
  • Complements existing budgetary tools, including those used during the pandemic.

5. Global Competitors and Challenges

• China:

  • Aims to meet 40% of local demand by 2020 and 70% by 2025.
  • State-driven industrial policy has led to significant growth in its semiconductor sector.

• United States:

  • No official production targets, but has implemented restrictive policies against Chinese access to semiconductor technologies.
  • Has a strong presence in the global semiconductor market.

• Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan:

  • All have ambitious growth strategies in the semiconductor industry.
  • Japan leads in niche areas like photoresist.
  • South Korea and Taiwan are targeting leadership in advanced node manufacturing.

6. Policy Recommendations

• Financing the Semiconductor Ecosystem:

  • The EU must mobilize substantial public funds, including the 43 billion EUR mentioned in the Chips Act.
  • Budgetary constraints need to be addressed to support the necessary investments.

• Nurturing Human Resources:

  • Developing a skilled workforce is essential for sustaining innovation and growth in the semiconductor sector.

• Creating an Integrated Ecosystem:

  • A unified European semiconductor ecosystem is needed to compete globally.
  • Collaboration between Member States and the EU is crucial for success.

Key Information

• Supply Chain Vulnerabilities:

  • Europe's dependence on external suppliers, particularly from East Asia, is a major risk.
  • Geopolitical tensions, such as the US-China rivalry, have exposed these weaknesses.

• Technological Sovereignty:

  • The EU's goal of ensuring access to state-of-the-art technology is framed as a matter of both competitiveness and sovereignty.
  • The Chips Act and IPCEI are key tools in this effort.

• Market Demand:

  • Semiconductor consumption in Europe is expected to almost double by 2030, driven by digital and green transformation.
  • Advanced node semiconductors will be in high demand for applications such as electric vehicles, AI, and IoT.

• Private Investment and State Aid:

  • Private investment in manufacturing is unlikely without significant State aid.
  • The EU must create a supportive environment to attract and scale private capital.

Conclusion

The paper emphasizes the need for a balanced approach that combines market logic with strategic industrial policy. While the EU has historically resisted direct state intervention, the current global landscape necessitates a shift. The return of industrial policy in Europe is not about self-sufficiency but about reducing vulnerabilities and building a resilient, competitive semiconductor ecosystem. The EU's efforts, including the Chips Act and IPCEI, are critical in this endeavor, but their success depends on effective coordination, funding, and integration across the continent.