2010年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Resolution_of_Cross_35页_701kb

Summary of the IMF Paper: "Resolution of Cross-Border Banks—A Proposed Framework for Enhanced Coordination"

Core Content

This paper, prepared by the Legal and Monetary and Capital Markets Departments of the IMF and approved by Sean Hagan and José Víñals on June 11, 2010, addresses the challenges of resolving cross-border financial institutions in the wake of the global financial crisis. It outlines a pragmatic framework for enhanced coordination among national authorities to improve the effectiveness of cross-border bank resolution, reduce moral hazard, and limit the negative impacts of financial institution failures on global financial stability.

Main Viewpoints

• Financial globalization has led to the rise of international financial groups, which operate across borders and are not confined to traditional banking activities.
• Local resolution frameworks are inadequate for managing the complexities of cross-border financial institutions, as they are jurisdiction-specific and often fail to coordinate effectively during crises.
• The existing approach to cross-border resolution is costly and inefficient, leading to value destruction, contagion, and increased moral hazard.
• International cooperation is essential, but the establishment of a binding multilateral treaty is not feasible in the short term due to concerns over national sovereignty and fiscal costs.
• A de-globalization approach, where financial institutions are more localized, may be necessary but risks undermining market access and trade.

Key Information

1. The Need for a Cross-Border Resolution Framework

• The financial crisis has highlighted the urgent need for effective resolution mechanisms that can address the failures of globally active financial institutions.
• The current localized approach may force national authorities to choose between bail-outs that do not fully allocate losses or insolvency regimes that are not well-suited for restructuring.
• The paper argues that an international framework for resolution is necessary to prevent contagion and ensure that losses are borne by shareholders and creditors.

2. Proposed Framework for Enhanced Coordination

• The paper advocates for a non-binding framework that encourages cooperation among countries that meet certain standards.
• The framework includes four key elements:
  • Amended national laws to require coordination of resolution efforts with other jurisdictions.
  • Core-coordination standards that include harmonization of national resolution rules, robust supervision, and institutional capacity.
  • Principles for burden sharing in cases where public funding is needed.
  • Coordination procedures that enable rapid and cross-border resolution actions during crises.

3. Coordination Standards

• Harmonization of national resolution rules:
  • Non-discrimination against foreign creditors.
  • Appropriate intervention tools.
  • Robust creditor safeguards.
  • Clear rules on depositor priority.
• Robust supervision:
  • Requires that the home country's supervisory framework is strong enough to convince host countries of its leadership in resolution.
• Institutional capacity:
  • The home country must have sufficient resources and infrastructure to implement an international resolution solution.

4. Territoriality vs. Universality

• Territorial approaches involve local jurisdictions initiating separate insolvency proceedings and ring-fencing assets for the benefit of local creditors.
• Universal approaches allow for the extraterritorial application of insolvency proceedings, enabling the home country to manage the resolution of the entire group.
• The paper highlights that the USA and EU have mixed approaches, with some jurisdictions adopting a universal model for local banks and a territorial model for foreign branches.

5. Challenges to Coordination

• The absence of harmonized legal and regulatory frameworks across jurisdictions hampers effective resolution.
• The multiplicity of regulatory actors can impede coordination, especially in complex international financial groups.
• National authorities often prioritize local stakeholders, leading to a territorial focus that limits the effectiveness of cross-border resolution.

6. The Role of the Basel Committee

• The paper builds on the work of the Basel Committee's Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group.
• The Basel Concordat is cited as an important component of the core-coordination standards, aiming to align supervisory incentives and promote consolidated supervision.

Conclusion

• A pragmatic, non-binding framework for enhanced coordination is proposed as the most feasible solution in the medium term.
• The framework would require participating countries to meet certain standards and would be designed to facilitate rapid and effective resolution of cross-border financial institutions.
• The expansion of this framework to include more countries, especially developing and emerging markets, would enhance its effectiveness and global reach.