2022-10-02-IMF-IMF-从历史的角度看拉丁美洲的中央银行独立性与通货膨胀（英）_55页_1mb

Central banks in Latin America were established in the 1920s with a degree of legal independence, but this eroded during the Great Depression and subsequent decades, contributing to high and volatile inflation. Reforms in the 1990s granted central banks greater political and operational independence, focusing on price stability, which correlated with a steady decline in inflation. Empirical analysis confirms a strong negative association between central bank independence and inflation, with effects becoming more pronounced over time. Legal independence restricts fiscal dominance, reducing the likelihood of high-inflation episodes, especially when tied to limits on central bank lending to the government. Latin America's history underscores the risks of undermining central bank independence, highlighting its role in maintaining price stability and preventing inflation spirals. These findings are particularly relevant today as central banks navigate balancing act between inflation control and economic stimulus.