2016年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Ukraine_Ex_Post_Evaluation_of_Exceptional_Access_Under_the_2014_Stand_56页_1mb

Summary of Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2014 Stand-By Arrangement with Ukraine

Core Content

The Ex Post Evaluation (EPE) of the 2014 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Ukraine was conducted by the IMF staff team in September 2016, following the completion of the second review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in March 2015. The evaluation assessed whether the program met the exceptional access (EA) criteria and reviewed its performance in the context of the geopolitical and economic challenges Ukraine faced during 2014–15.

Main Objectives of the 2014 SBA

The 2014 SBA aimed to:

• Stabilize the macroeconomic situation in the short run.
• Implement deep-reaching reforms to strengthen governance and transparency.
• Lay the foundation for robust and balanced economic growth in the long term.

These reforms were intended to achieve and sustain external sustainability, ensure financial stability, fix public finances, rationalize the energy sector, and improve the business environment.

Key Policy Areas and Outturns

A. Macroeconomic Framework

• The program expected a strong V-shaped recovery, predicated on the implementation of policies and the assumption that the conflict in the East would be short-lived.
• Initial growth decline was due to reduced private consumption and investment, as well as fiscal consolidation.
• The recovery was not as strong as anticipated, and the recession proved deeper and more prolonged than expected.

B. Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy

• The SBA aimed to move towards a flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting.
• The hryvnia depreciated significantly, from 35% in 2013 to nearly 90% by the end of 2014, due to capital outflows and the loss of control over Crimea.
• The depreciation increased the cost of imported energy, contributing to inflation and Naftogaz's losses.

C. Financial Sector Policies

• Banking sector diagnostics were conducted, and many banks were resolved in an orderly manner.
• The program emphasized strengthening the banking system through recapitalization, unwinding related-party lending, and resolving impaired assets.

D. Fiscal Policy

• Fiscal consolidation began, although some measures were one-off or low-quality.
• The program included conditionality for improving tax and customs administrations.
• The focus was on avoiding tax policy changes that could increase deficits.

E. Energy Sector Policies

• Energy tariffs were raised to cost-recovery levels.
• The gas price dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz was a major issue.
• The conflict in the East and loss of control over Crimea led to significant losses for Naftogaz.

F. Governance and Business Climate Reforms

• The program aimed to address deep-seated governance and institutional problems.
• Anticorruption and governance reforms were initiated.
• The restructuring of state-owned enterprises and prosecution of high-level corruption cases were emphasized.

Program Design and Strategy

A. Program Design

• The SBA was a 24-month program, with a total access of SDR 10.976 billion (800% of quota).
• The program was designed with upfront conditionality to reduce implementation risks.
• The program was initially monitored on a bimonthly basis to allow for early corrective actions.

B. Program Strategy

• The program focused on short-run stabilization, medium-term reforms, and long-term growth.
• The first review emphasized energy, fiscal, and financial sector reforms, while the second review turned to governance reforms.
• The program was based on the assumption that the conflict in the East would not escalate, which proved to be incorrect.

Compliance with Fund Policies

• The exceptional access criteria were not well justified, as the program faced significant risks and did not achieve many of its goals.
• The financing envelope constrained policy space to some extent, and an earlier debt operation could have helped.
• The program helped garner international support and possibly prevented worse outcomes.

Key Lessons from the 2014 SBA

• In active conflict situations, having a well-developed and realistic adverse scenario and contingency plans is critical.
• Programs in countries with recurring economic crises should not hold back from pursuing structural reforms, although these need to be carefully prioritized.
• It would be useful to consider developing staff guidance on integrating risks into the outlook and assessing the probability of debt sustainability for the second EA criterion, and the prospects of program success for the fourth EA criterion.

Authorities' Views

• The authorities recognized the failure of previous policies and had a strong will to implement reforms.
• The new administration was seen as providing a window of opportunity for change.
• The program helped in securing international support and initiating important reforms.

Conclusion

• The 2014 SBA was an important policy anchor in an uncertain environment.
• The program helped Ukraine regain confidence and international support, although it did not fully achieve its objectives.
• The experience highlights the need for better risk assessment and contingency planning in similar situations.