2012年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Iceland_Ex_Post_Evaluation_of_Exceptional_Access_Under_the_2008_Stand_33页_973kb
报告摘要
Iceland: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access Under the 2008 Stand-by Arrangement
Core Content
Iceland experienced a severe financial and economic crisis in late 2008, following the collapse of its three largest banks—Landsbanki, Glitnir, and Kaupthing—which accounted for 85% of the banking system and nearly 900% of GDP. The crisis led to a sharp depreciation of the krona, a deep recession, and a significant decline in real GDP and domestic demand by 10.5% and 23%, respectively, between 2009 and 2010. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a 24-month Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) in November 2008, providing SDR 1.4 billion (equivalent to 1,190% of quota) to support the economy. Additional financial assistance was provided by Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Poland, and the Faroe Islands, totaling $2.25 billion.
The program was designed to restore confidence, stabilize the economy, and put public finances on a sustainable path. It included capital controls to prevent further depreciation of the krona, a multi-year fiscal consolidation, and restructuring of the banking system to limit the absorption of private sector losses by the public sector.
Main Points
1. Context of the 2008 SBA
- The banking sector had grown to nearly tenfold of GDP by 2007, fueled by easy access to international capital markets and rapid credit expansion.
- The economy had experienced strong growth from 2004 to 2007, with real GDP increasing by 28% cumulatively, driven by private consumption and investments in power-intensive industries.
- External imbalances were significant, with a current account deficit exceeding 15% of GDP annually and net external indebtedness reaching 110% of GDP in 2007.
- The crisis was exacerbated by poor asset quality, asset bubbles, and a sudden stop in capital inflows.
2. Key Aspects of Program Design and Exceptional Access
- The SBA aimed to stabilize the krona, consolidate public finances, and rebuild the banking system.
- The program was frontloaded, with SDR 1.4 billion approved as exceptional access.
- Capital controls were introduced to stabilize the exchange rate, which had been a key tool in preventing further depreciation and maintaining financial stability.
- Fiscal policy shifted from an accommodative stance to a consolidation path to ensure long-term sustainability.
- The program was supported by strong ownership and a broad consensus within Iceland, which contributed to its successful implementation.
3. Policy Assessment
- Financial Sector: The banking system was restructured, with nonperforming loans still high and requiring further reduction through private sector debt restructuring.
- Fiscal Policy: The fiscal consolidation was more frontloaded than initially planned, with the government committing to limit the absorption of bank restructuring costs by public finances.
- Monetary Policy and Capital Controls: Capital controls were effective in stabilizing the krona and preventing disorderly capital outflows. The program included a gradual liberalization of capital controls as macroeconomic stability improved.
4. Conclusions and Lessons
- The program was successfully completed, although with some delays due to political uncertainty and the Icesave dispute.
- The Icesave dispute, involving the UK and Netherlands, delayed program reviews and affected financing assurances. The dispute was eventually resolved through legal channels, with the Icelandic Supreme Court upholding the Emergency Law in 2011.
- Key lessons from the program include:
- Strong ownership is critical for program success.
- Fiscal consolidation can be eased by cutting expenditures without compromising welfare benefits and introducing a more progressive tax system.
- A bank restructuring approach that allows creditors to share upside gains but also bear part of the initial costs helps limit public sector absorption of private sector losses.
- Capital controls can be used temporarily in crisis situations to prevent disorderly deleveraging and stabilize the economy.
Key Information
- The program was structured with a mix of quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets.
- The SBA had a high level of access, both in terms of quota and GDP, reflecting the scale of the crisis.
- The program's structural conditionality was in line with the average for Fund-supported programs, though the financial sector conditionality was twice the average.
- The program was completed on time, with the final review held in August 2011.
- The Icesave dispute was a major challenge, but its resolution significantly reduced litigation risks.
Ongoing Challenges
- Fiscal Sustainability: Public debt remains high, requiring continued consolidation efforts.
- Capital Account Liberalization: There is a need to gradually liberalize capital controls to avoid both distortions and disorderly depreciation.
- Financial Sector: Nonperforming loans still require reduction through private sector restructuring.
- Financial Supervision: Remaining gaps in supervision must be addressed in line with the Financial Supervisory Authority's (FME) action plan.
Summary of Outcomes
- The exchange rate was stabilized.
- Public finances were put on a sustainable path.
- Significant progress was made in restructuring the banking system.
- Private sector debt restructuring is ongoing.
Tables
Table 1: Iceland: Selected Economic Indicators 2005–12
| Year | GDP (USD) | Current Account Deficit (USD) | Public Debt (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2005 | - | - | - |
| 2006 | - | - | - |
| 2007 | - | - | - |
| 2008 | - | - | - |
| 2009 | - | - | - |
| 2010 | - | - | - |
| 2011 | - | - | - |
| 2012 | - | - | - |
Table 2: Iceland: Medium-Term Projections, 2009–17
| Year | GDP Growth (%) | Public Debt (as % of GDP) | Fiscal Balance (as % of GDP) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | - | 125% | - |
| 2010 | - | - | - |
| 2011 | - | - | - |
| 2012 | - | - | - |
| 2013 | - | - | - |
| 2014 | - | - | - |
| 2015 | - | - | - |
| 2016 | - | - | - |
| 2017 | - | - | - |
Table 3: Iceland: Quantitative Performance Criteria and Indicative Targets
| Performance Criteria | Target |
|---|---|
| Primary Balance (as % of GDP) | - |
| Gross Public Debt (as % of GDP) | - |
| Capital Account Liberalization | - |
| Exchange Rate Stability | - |
Figures
Figure 1: Iceland Program Projections and Outcomes 2008–2011
- The program projected a sharp decline in output, followed by a relatively fast export-led recovery.
- Inflation was expected to decline quickly, but the actual decline was slower than anticipated.
Figure 2: Loan Portfolio Restructuring: An Accelerating Process in 2011
- The restructuring of loan portfolios accelerated in 2011, with significant progress made in resolving the banking crisis.
Figure 3: Monetary Policy Operations and Liquidity Management
- The Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) implemented capital controls and foreign exchange rationing to stabilize the krona and manage liquidity.
Figure 4: Iceland: Price and Exchange Rate Developments
- The krona depreciated sharply during the crisis, but exchange rate stability was achieved through the program.
Figure 5: Iceland: Capital Control Liberalization Challenges
- Capital controls were a key tool in the program, with gradual liberalization planned as macroeconomic stability improved.
Boxes
Box 1: Icesave: Background and Implications for Financing Assurances
- Icesave was an online savings account brand operated by Landsbanki in the UK and Netherlands.
- The Icesave dispute led to legal and political challenges, delaying program reviews and affecting financing assurances.
- The dispute was eventually resolved with the Icelandic Supreme Court upholding the Emergency Law in 2011.
Box 2: Key Litigation Risks
- The Icesave dispute and challenges to the Emergency Law were the two major litigation risks.
- The Emergency Law prioritized depositors over unsecured creditors, which could have worsened the Icesave situation.
- The Supreme Court ruling in 2011 reduced litigation risks significantly.
试读结束,高清完整版pdf/doc/ppt,请点下载