2014年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Ukraine_Ex_Post_Evaluation_of_Exceptional_Access_Under_the_2010_Stand_44页_1mb

Summary of the Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access Under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement with Ukraine

Core Content

This report provides an ex-post evaluation of the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Ukraine, prepared by the IMF staff team and approved by the Executive Board. The evaluation assesses the effectiveness of the program in meeting its objectives and the appropriateness of its design and financing in light of the country's macroeconomic and structural challenges.

Main Objectives of the 2010 SBA

The primary goals of the 2010 SBA were:

• To restore market confidence by placing public finances on a sustainable path.
• To increase the country's resilience to shocks through improved monetary policy and exchange rate flexibility.
• To consolidate public and energy sector finances.
• To restore banking system soundness through recapitalization and strengthened supervision.

The program also aimed to develop a more robust monetary policy framework focused on domestic price stability.

Key Program Design and Financing Elements

Program Design

• The 2010 SBA was designed to address Ukraine's significant fiscal and structural vulnerabilities, which had been exacerbated by the 2008 global financial crisis.
• The program included both quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets.
• It incorporated key structural reforms from the 2008 SBA, such as energy sector reform and public enterprise restructuring.
• The program emphasized the importance of ownership and governance, with a focus on institutional and political capacity to implement reforms.

Financing

• The SBA provided financing equivalent to 729 percent of quota (approximately $15 billion).
• The first disbursement was 91.1 percent of quota, with subsequent disbursements at 73 percent and 55 percent of quota.
• The rationale for the high access was based on Ukraine's external financing needs, reduced availability of international financing, and the need to strengthen reserves.
• Co-financing was expected from other IFIs such as the European Commission, the World Bank, and the EBRD.

Exceptional Access Criteria

• The program was approved under the modified exceptional access criteria, which required the following:
  • Criterion 1: Ukraine faced potential balance of payments pressures, justifying the need for exceptional financing.
  • Criterion 2: The program included a rigorous analysis of public debt sustainability, projecting it to peak at around 40 percent of GDP.
  • Criterion 3: The program was expected to help Ukraine regain access to private capital markets, which was supported by the Eurobond placement shortly after approval.
  • Criterion 4: The program was seen as having a strong prospect of success, supported by a more cohesive government and a clear reform strategy.

Implementation and Performance

• The program was implemented with a focus on fiscal consolidation, energy sector reform, and banking system stabilization.
• The program's conditionality was extensive, reflecting the high implementation risks and the need for structural reforms.
• Despite the program's ambitious goals, it faced significant challenges, including weak political commitment and institutional capacity.
• The program deviated from its path after the first review, leading to delays in Article IV consultations and a prolonged period of financial uncertainty.
• The new government, which took office in March 2010, was more stable and committed to reform than its predecessor, which had been dysfunctional.

Lessons for Future Fund Engagement

• Ownership and Governance: Strong ownership and political commitment are critical for successful program implementation.
• Conditionality: Extensive conditionality was appropriate due to the high risks of implementation and the need for structural reforms.
• Program Duration: While the 29-month program was long enough to cover necessary reforms, a shorter duration might have been more efficient in limiting the Fund's financial exposure.
• Financing Levels: The program's financing was on the high side, given the improved macroeconomic outlook and the country's ability to attract private capital inflows.
• Front-Loading: Limited front-loading of financing created additional incentives for the authorities to meet performance criteria and maintain program momentum.

Key Challenges

• The program faced implementation risks due to weak political will and institutional capacity.
• The fiscal adjustment was more challenging than expected, with deficits exceeding initial projections.
• The energy sector remained a major source of quasi-fiscal deficits, and reform efforts were hampered by political opposition and vested interests.
• The program's long duration exposed the Fund to risks of prolonged non-compliance and financial strain.

Conclusion

The 2010 SBA with Ukraine was designed to address significant fiscal and structural vulnerabilities, and it included appropriate conditionality and financing. However, the program's implementation was inconsistent, and its long duration may have been suboptimal. The evaluation highlights the importance of political commitment, institutional capacity, and the need for a balanced approach to financing and conditionality in future Fund engagements.