2011年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Costa_Rica_Ex_Post_Evaluation_of_Exceptional_Access_Under_the_2009_Stand_28页_730kb

Costa Rica: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access Under the 2009 Stand-By Arrangement

I. Introduction and Summary

• The IMF approved a 15-month high-access precautionary stand-by arrangement for Costa Rica on April 10, 2009.
• The program was designed to provide a liquidity buffer and support the authorities' macroeconomic strategy in the face of global financial crisis-related risks.
• The program remained on track and was not drawn upon, suggesting it effectively shielded Costa Rica from external financing risks.
• The report reviews the program's performance, including its design, financing, outcomes, and lessons learned.
• The program's immediate objectives were met, and the economy rebounded relatively quickly after the global crisis.

II. Economic Context

• Costa Rica's economy was in a boom phase prior to the global financial crisis, with high growth rates and strong economic fundamentals.
• Real GDP growth averaged 6.7% from 2003 to 2007, well above the region's average.
• Unemployment reached levels not seen since the early 1990s, and poverty rates declined significantly.
• The current account deficit was covered by FDI and foreign exchange reserves remained at comfortable levels.
• Inflation remained high (double-digits) during the period, and the central bank (BCCR) was in the process of transitioning to inflation targeting.

III. Why Did the Authorities Request a Program?

• The global financial crisis led to a drop in exports and capital inflows, and exchange rate pressures.
• The authorities anticipated continued global turmoil and sought IMF support to protect against potential spillovers and bolster confidence in their policies.
• The program aimed to counter the threat of external financing shortfall through a tighter monetary stance and countercyclical fiscal policy.
• The authorities had already prepared economic policies for 2009, and the program was a supportive measure rather than a requirement for policy change.
• The program duration of 15 months was chosen to address the uncertainty associated with upcoming elections in February 2010.

IV. Program Ownership and Design

A. Ownership

• The government demonstrated strong ownership by proactively engaging with the IMF before the crisis worsened.
• The program was based on pre-existing economic policies, and the IMF financing was used to support these rather than impose new measures.
• The authorities also engaged with other international financial institutions to secure additional support.

B. Macroeconomic and Financial Policy Design

• The program aimed to reduce inflation and defend the exchange rate band while gradually increasing exchange rate flexibility.
• The central bank raised short-term interest rates and adjusted the exchange rate band's crawl rate to manage inflation and currency pressures.
• Fiscal policy focused on providing stimulus through increased social and capacity-building spending, using the fiscal space built in previous years.
• The program included benchmarks for financial sector reforms, including the introduction of a bank resolution framework and a system-wide deposit insurance scheme.

C. Conditionality

• The program conditionality emphasized maintaining sufficient foreign exchange reserves and cautious fiscal policies.
• The authorities were required to contain the fiscal stimulus to ensure investor confidence and support the transition to a flexible exchange rate regime.
• The floor on net international reserves (NIR) was set to ensure adequate buffers against balance-of-payments shocks.

V. Program Outcomes and Overall Assessment

• Elements of Success:

  • The external risks did not materialize.
  • The economy rebounded relatively quickly after the global crisis.
  • The authorities submitted necessary financial sector reform laws before the program ended.

• Challenges Ahead:

  • Structural reforms during the program period were slow.
  • Fiscal risks increased, and the transition toward inflation targeting was not accelerated.
  • The authorities did not consolidate public finances during the recovery, despite recommendations from the IMF.

• Key Lessons:

  • Strong program ownership and alignment with existing policy goals are important for success.
  • Opportunities for structural reform should be seized during periods of economic stress.
  • The need for fiscal discipline and long-term financial sector strengthening remains critical.

• Concluding Remarks:

  • The program was successful in its immediate objectives and provided a buffer against external risks.
  • However, more structural reforms and fiscal consolidation would have enhanced long-term stability and competitiveness.