2023-07-12-世界银行-贸易信贷_新兴经济体与发展中国家的理论与证据（英）_31页_335kb

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<center>Policy Research Working Paper 10468 Trade Credit Theory and Evidence for Emerging Economies and Developing Countries Robert Cull Chorching Goh L. Colin Xu Development Economics Development Research Group June 2023</center>

Abstract

Trade credit is a crucial source of financing for businesses, especially in developing and emerging economies. While it requires less formal contract enforcement, it is particularly relevant where legal systems are weak. Suppliers’ information advantages and the ability to monitor buyers allow them to provide trade credit, sometimes at the expense of formal financial institutions. Empirical evidence suggests that medium-sized firms and those in middle-income countries rely more heavily on trade credit. Detailed data on supplier-customer relationships is vital for testing theoretical predictions and improving trade credit terms to enhance productivity.

Core Findings

1. Trade Credit and Information Advantages

Trade credit is pervasive across firms of all sizes and income levels.
Suppliers have better information about buyers, enabling them to assess creditworthiness and mitigate risks. This results in long-term relationships and signaling effects compared to formal financial institutions (e.g., banks).
In countries with weak legal systems, trade credit is less tied to formal institutions but more reliant on informal networks and supplier relationships.

2. The "Goldilocks" Region

Trade credit is most heavily relied upon by medium-sized firms and those in middle-income countries.
Poorer firms or those in developed countries tend to rely less on trade credit due to better access to formal financing or stronger institutions.
Trade credit is associated with productivity growth in lower-middle-income countries, but not in the poorest or richest nations.

3. Trade Credit as a Substitute or Complement to Bank Credit

Trade credit can act as a substitute for bank credit in constrained firms during economic crises or periods of monetary tightening.
However, in extreme financial distress, it cannot sustain itself or replace formal credit entirely due to limited funds.

Theories of Trade Credit

1. Supplier Information

Suppliers use private information to assess buyer creditworthiness, reducing adverse selection problems faced by banks.
Trade credit serves as a signal to banks about potential customers, allowing suppliers to extend credit while banks refrain from lending otherwise.

2. Market/bargaining power

Suppliers with low bargaining power over buyers often extend more trade credit.
Stronger suppliers (e.g., those with high margins) are less compelled to offer trade credit but benefit from equity-like stakes in relationships.

3. Product-Specific RSI Investments

Goods that are differentiated or harder to divert are more amenable to trade credit, as suppliers can enforce repayment by restricting product supply.
Trade credit incentivizes investments in supplier-customer relationships (e.g., R&D, specialized production).

4. Switching Suppliers and Competition

Trade credit improves supply terms by enabling customers to switch suppliers, especially in environments with limited legal support.
Competition among suppliers encourages longer trade terms but can lead to inefficiencies via the "free-rider" problem.

5. Quality Guarantee

Trade credit can signal product quality and serve as a warranty, particularly when buyers face uncertainty about new or small suppliers.

Contextual Analysis

1. Developed vs. Emerging Economies

Trade credit is crucial in contexts with weak legal systems, supported by social networks (e.g., hometown connections).
Vietnam, post-communist transition economies (e.g., Poland), and China exhibit varying degrees of reliance on trade credit, driven by institutional deficits or supplier relationships.
Formal institutions can enhance trade credit by enabling customer-switching and competition.

2. Country-Level Patterns

Trade credit is more prevalent in middle-income countries where legal systems are insufficient to support formal contracts.
Poorer countries rely more on trade credit as a substitute for underdeveloped banking sectors, but poorer informal institutions limit its reach and effectiveness.

Conclusion

Trade credit remains a vital financing mechanism for constrained firms and in developing economies.
Its effectiveness depends on supplier information advantages, market dynamics, and the quality of institutions.
Detailed data on supplier-customer relationships and RSI investments can refine policies and theories.
Trade credit is most beneficial for medium-sized firms and middle-income countries, acting as a catalyst for productivity.