2018年-PIIE彼得森国际经济研究所_better-european-architecture-fight-money-laundering_15页_278kb

POLICY BRIEF Summary: A Better European Architecture to Fight Money Laundering

Core Content

This policy brief discusses the challenges and shortcomings of the current anti-money laundering (AML) supervision framework in the European Union (EU) and proposes a stronger EU-level supervisory architecture to address these issues. The authors, Joshua Kirschenbaum and Nicolas Véron, highlight the growing concern over money laundering and its link to security threats, particularly those originating from the former Soviet Union. They argue that the fragmented and national-level AML supervision system is ineffective and vulnerable to political influence and regulatory capture.

Main Viewpoints

• AML Supervision Fragmentation: AML supervision is currently managed by national authorities, which creates a "vicious circle" where weak links in one member state can undermine the entire European AML system.
• Need for EU-Level Supervision: The authors emphasize the necessity of a stronger EU-level role in AML supervision to ensure consistency, effectiveness, and independence across the single market.
• Systemic Nature of the Problem: Money laundering is not just a national issue but a systemic one, affecting the integrity of the entire EU financial system.
• Two-Tier vs. Unitary Architecture: The EU faces a choice between maintaining a two-tier system (with national authorities retaining primary responsibility) and adopting a unitary system (with a central European authority overseeing AML supervision).

Key Information

Current AML Supervisory Framework

• The EU has implemented five AML Directives (AMLDs), with AMLD4 in force since 2015 and AMLD5 pending transposition.
• AML supervision in EU member states is carried out by a variety of national authorities, including financial intelligence units (FIUs) and prudential supervisors.
• The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) include the EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA, which coordinate AML supervision but do not have full authority to override national decisions.

Recent AML Cases

• Major banks in 15+ EU countries have faced AML violations, with some cases involving billions of dollars.
• Notable cases include the liquidation of ABLV Bank in Latvia, the reopening of investigations into Danske Bank, and the largest AML fine in European history against ING Bank.
• These cases highlight the lack of uniformity and effectiveness in AML enforcement across the EU.

Supervisory Challenges

• Heterogeneity: AML enforcement varies significantly among member states, with some countries (like the UK) publishing more information and imposing higher fines.
• Ineffective National Supervision: Weak AML supervision in some countries attracts illicit actors and undermines the entire system.
• Cross-Border Risks: The integration of the single market and the lack of centralized AML oversight create opportunities for money launderers to exploit regulatory gaps.

Proposed Solutions

• European AML Authority (EAMLA): The authors recommend the creation of a unitary European AML Authority with the power to supervise banks, financial institutions, and non-financial firms.
• Enhanced Two-Tier Model: The European Commission has proposed a reinforced two-tier model, which would give the EBA the authority to request national AML supervisors to investigate and, in extreme cases, impose direct decisions.
• Unitary Architecture Benefits:
  • Reduces information sharing problems and task allocation conflicts.
  • Increases supervisory effectiveness and independence.
  • Spur further harmonization of AML regulations.
  • Enhances cooperation with international counterparts like the US.

Comparison of Options

The brief outlines seven possible options for AML supervision, with the following key considerations:

• Option 1 (ECB as AML supervisor): While the ECB has a strong track record in prudential supervision, it lacks a mandate for AML and would not cover the entire single market.
• Option 2 (Each ESA for its sector): This model maintains sector-specific oversight but risks fragmentation and regulatory arbitrage.
• Option 3 (EBA for banks only): The EBA has been the most active in AML, but it lacks direct supervisory authority over non-bank entities.
• Option 4 (ESMA for financial firms): ESMA has experience in cross-sectoral oversight and could be a viable candidate for broader AML supervision.
• Option 5 (Joint ESA venture): Building on the AMLC, this could provide a more integrated approach but may lack the necessary independence and authority.
• Option 6 (New dedicated agency): A new agency, such as the European AML Authority, would offer a more centralized and independent approach.
• Option 7 (Enhanced cooperation agency): A fallback option if other models fail, but unlikely to be the preferred solution due to its limited scope.

Conclusion

The authors conclude that a unitary AML architecture is the most effective and feasible solution to the systemic weaknesses in the current system. It would enhance the EU's ability to combat money laundering, reduce the risk of regulatory arbitrage, and ensure a more uniform and independent supervisory framework. A unitary system does not require a single rulebook to be in place and can accelerate the development of harmonized AML regulations across the EU.