2014年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_Ukraine_and_the_EU_after_the_Orange_Revolution_4页_99kb

Summary of "Ukraine and the EU after the Orange Revolution"

Core Content

The document discusses the potential consequences of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections, which were widely considered to be fraudulent, and outlines three strategic approaches the EU should take in response to the political uncertainty in Ukraine. The authors emphasize the importance of supporting democratic processes, adapting EU policies based on the election outcome, and preparing for a potential shift in Ukraine's political direction towards European integration.

Main Points

1. Uncertainty and Implications of the Election Outcome

• The 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine were disputed and widely seen as fraudulent.
• The EU, along with other international actors, has not recognized Viktor Yanukovych as the legitimate winner, while Russia has.
• The outcome of the election has created a political vacuum, with the potential for further instability.
• The possibility of secession in the southeast of Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) is mentioned, though it is considered unlikely.

2. Three EU Strategies

The EU is advised to develop three distinct strategies based on the possible election results:

Strategy 1: Support for Democratic Transition

• The EU should support the peaceful transfer of power from President Kuchma to his successor.
• In the event of state-instigated violence, the EU should suspend all contacts with the Ukrainian leadership and impose sanctions.
• The EU should push for a swift resolution of the crisis, avoiding stalling tactics.
• The EU should coordinate with the OSCE and other international bodies to ensure fair elections.
• Close cooperation with Russia is necessary, but the EU should not compromise on its principles.

Strategy 2: Response to a Yanukovych Presidency

• If Yanukovych wins, the EU should avoid disengagement, as seen in the case of Belarus.
• The EU should shift its focus from economic aid to political assistance, supporting democratic institutions and civil society.
• Political dialogue with the executive should be minimized until new elections are held or parliamentary elections in 2006.
• The EU should engage closely with the Ukrainian parliament, where the opposition is strong.

Strategy 3: A Yushchenko Presidency and EU Membership

• A Yushchenko victory would signal a strong pro-European orientation and commitment to reform.
• The EU should prepare to acknowledge Ukraine as a potential candidate for EU membership.
• The current Action Plan is insufficient and should be renegotiated to reflect a more supportive stance.
• Immediate measures such as granting market-economy status, removing trade barriers, and initiating visa facilitation negotiations are recommended.
• The EU should organize a donor conference to support Ukraine’s reform agenda, similar to the one held for Georgia after its Rose Revolution.

Key Information

• Political Vacuum: The election results have left Ukraine in a legal and political uncertainty, requiring urgent EU intervention.
• Regional Autonomy: While some regions have called for autonomy, the risk of secession is limited to the southeast.
• EU’s Role: The EU must be proactive in supporting Ukraine’s democratic development and must not be deterred by political convenience.
• Copenhagen Criteria: Ukraine’s potential fulfillment of these criteria may force the EU to reconsider its stance on membership.
• Strategic Coordination: The EU should coordinate with the US, Canada, and other international actors to support Ukraine’s reform process.

Conclusion

The Orange Revolution presents a pivotal moment for Ukraine and the EU. The EU must adopt a clear, flexible, and principled strategy to support Ukraine’s democratic aspirations, manage the political fallout, and prepare for the possibility of EU membership. This requires both immediate action and long-term planning, with a focus on strengthening bilateral relations and fostering European integration.