2011年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Republic_of_Belarus_Ex_Post_Evaluation_of_Exceptional_Access_Under_the_2009_Stand_37页_885kb

Summary of the Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2009 Stand-By Arrangement for the Republic of Belarus

Core Content

This document provides an ex post evaluation of the 2009 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) for the Republic of Belarus, which was implemented in response to the global economic crisis. The SBA aimed to address Belarus's macroeconomic vulnerabilities and support the country through the crisis by providing large upfront financing, implementing macroeconomic adjustments, and promoting structural reforms. The evaluation highlights both the successes and shortcomings of the program.

Main Objectives of the Program

The 2009 SBA had the following main objectives:

• To address the most pressing macroeconomic vulnerabilities, including an overvalued currency, large current account deficits, and low reserves.
• To implement a strong macroeconomic policy adjustment, including devaluation, wage restraint, and tighter fiscal policy.
• To promote focused structural reforms, especially in the financial sector and privatization.
• To ensure the program was well-designed and followed the Fund's procedures for exceptional access.

Key Outcomes and Performance

• The program was largely successful in preventing a balance of payments crisis, avoiding a deep recession, and keeping unemployment low.
• The current account deficit widened more than expected, from 8.25% of GDP in 2008 to 13% in 2009, due to external shocks and continued credit expansion.
• The real effective exchange rate (REER) became overvalued by about 14-16% in 2010, despite the devaluation.
• The program was seen as a critical step towards medium-term reforms, with a successor program being considered.

Main Views and Evaluation

A. Macroeconomic Response

• The macroeconomic policy mix, including exchange rate realignment and tight fiscal policy, was appropriate and aligned with Fund policies.
• Devaluation and wage restraint were used to improve competitiveness.
• The authorities implemented a balanced budget and froze wages to reduce fiscal pressure.
• Despite these measures, credit growth remained high, which exacerbated external imbalances and undermined fiscal sustainability.

B. Structural Reforms

• Structural reforms, particularly in the financial sector and privatization, were a key focus of the program.
• While some reforms were implemented, key targets—such as reducing directed lending and advancing privatization—were missed or delayed.
• The program was seen as a starting point for more comprehensive reforms in the medium term.

C. Fund's Financing Strategy

• The Fund provided exceptionally large financing, which helped stabilize the economy and prevent a deeper crisis.
• The financing was combined with strong policy adjustment and structural reforms.
• The program's design allowed for flexibility in response to external shocks, including the ability to widen the exchange rate band and allow additional depreciation.

D. Exceptional Access Procedures

• The program followed the Fund's exceptional access procedures, which required a high level of ownership and commitment from the authorities.
• The lack of full ownership at the highest levels contributed to the continued growth of lending under government programs (LGP), despite the program's efforts to curb it.
• The program was seen as a learning process for Belarus, which had a long history of limited interaction with the Fund.

Key Shortcomings

• The program's design failed to fully address directed lending, which continued to be a significant source of macroeconomic imbalances.
• The initial approach to curbing LGP was not effective, as it was not directly targeting the issue.
• The program's reliance on government deposits and NBRB lending to finance LGP undermined fiscal discipline.
• The real effective exchange rate (REER) remained overvalued, contributing to persistent current account deficits and external debt burden.

Looking Ahead

• The structural reform agenda remains largely unfinished, with a need for more comprehensive reforms in the financial and private sectors.
• Ownership and commitment at the highest levels are crucial for the success of Fund-supported programs.
• The program's design could have been improved by incorporating more explicit conditionality and better monitoring of LGP.
• Including net LGP in the fiscal accounts above the line would improve transparency and accountability.

Critical Lessons

• Ownership is essential for the effectiveness of program conditionality.
• The program demonstrated the importance of a flexible and credible exchange rate regime.
• The need for stronger fiscal discipline and more effective monitoring of quasi-fiscal activities like LGP was evident.
• The Fund's role in supporting Belarus during the crisis was significant, but the program's limitations highlighted the challenges of implementing reforms in a politically sensitive context.

Conclusion

The 2009 SBA was a well-designed program that helped Belarus navigate the global economic crisis. However, its effectiveness was constrained by the lack of full ownership and the continued expansion of directed lending. The program laid the groundwork for further reforms but left many key issues unresolved. The experience underscores the importance of strong institutional commitment and the need for more robust conditionality and monitoring mechanisms in exceptional access programs.