欧洲政策研究中心-波罗的海国家如何通过跨大西洋合作支持5G安全？（英）-2021.8-26页_3mb

Summary: How Can the Baltic States Support 5G Security Through Transatlantic Cooperation?

Core Content

The document explores how the Baltic states — Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia — can support 5G security through transatlantic cooperation, particularly with the United States. It emphasizes the importance of 5G as the backbone of the future digital economy and highlights the security risks associated with Chinese telecommunications companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, due to their legal obligations to provide information to Chinese intelligence services. The paper argues that 5G security is not only a national issue but also a critical concern for NATO, as future military solutions may rely on commercial 5G technology.

Main Points

1. 5G and Its Strategic Importance

• 5G is expected to significantly enhance data transfer speeds, reduce latency, and increase network capacity, enabling advanced technologies like autonomous vehicles, remote surgery, and smart cities.
• The global economic impact of 5G is projected to exceed $1.3 trillion by 2030, with the U.S. GDP expected to increase by $484 billion.
• 5G is not just a technological milestone but also a critical component of future infrastructure, requiring long-term security strategies.

2. Security Concerns and Political Risks

• The Prague Proposals (2019) identified that 5G security threats may arise from the political, economic, or other behaviors of malicious actors exploiting dependency on communication technologies.
• The U.S. introduced the Clean Path requirement in 2020 to eliminate untrusted suppliers, including Huawei and ZTE, from 5G networks.
• The EU has developed a 5G cybersecurity toolbox but lacks unified and detailed regulation across member states, leading to fragmented approaches to 5G security.

3. Baltic States' Proactive Approach

• The Baltic states have shown strong commitment to NATO and have taken decisive steps to secure their 5G infrastructure.
• They have all joined the U.S.-led Clean Network Initiative, committing to rigorous provider evaluations and the exclusion of untrustworthy suppliers.
• Lithuania was the first to withdraw from the 16+1 format, a Chinese-led initiative, and has encouraged other countries to follow suit.

4. Legal and Policy Frameworks

• Legal frameworks are being developed in the Baltic states to ensure the exclusion of untrustworthy suppliers, particularly those from China.
• Estonia introduced the Huawei Law in 2020, requiring authorization for the use of communications hardware and software that affect national security.
• Latvia and Lithuania have also introduced regulations that emphasize the importance of security in critical infrastructure and the need for trustworthiness in suppliers.

5. Technology Development and Innovation

• The RAN (Radio Access Network) is a key area of concern due to its increasing reliance on cloud-based software and vendor-specific equipment.
• The limited number of global RAN suppliers (Huawei, ZTE, Nokia, Ericsson, Samsung) highlights the need for diversification and the development of alternatives.
• Open RAN (O-RAN) is being promoted as a potential solution to reduce dependency on single vendors, but it is not the only path forward.
• The Baltic states are investing in R&D and have the potential to become key players in secure 5G technology development.

6. Ongoing Projects and Collaboration Opportunities

• Estonia hosts the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which is conducting research on 5G security for military mobility and secure use of private and commercial networks.
• Latvia has launched the first military 5G test site in Europe, demonstrating its commitment to testing and developing 5G-based defense technologies.
• Lithuania is developing wideband RF and mm-wave components for 5G and has plans to invest in a semiconductor factory by 2030.
• The Regional Cyber Defense Center (RCDC), a U.S.-Lithuania initiative, aims to foster cybersecurity collaboration, information sharing, and R&D in the region.

Key Recommendations

• Strengthen Transatlantic Collaboration: The U.S. should initiate bilateral agreements with Lithuania and Latvia on R&D, testing, and evaluation of 5G projects, following the model of the Estonian-U.S. cybersecurity collaboration.
• Expand RCDC Activities: The RCDC should focus on 5G security projects, including information exchange on cyberattacks, training, and R&D cooperation.
• Support the U.S. Transatlantic Telecommunications Security Act: This legislation should be approved to fund 5G infrastructure development in Central and Eastern Europe and support the Three Seas Initiative as an alternative to the 16+1 format.
• Promote Best Practices and Unified Standards: NATO and EU should work together to develop unified security standards for 5G infrastructure, ensuring consistency and reducing vulnerabilities across the alliance.

Conclusion

The Baltic states have demonstrated a strong commitment to securing their 5G infrastructure and reducing dependency on Chinese technology. Their proactive policies and investments in R&D make them valuable partners for transatlantic cooperation in building a more secure and resilient 5G network. The U.S. and its allies must leverage these efforts to ensure a unified and robust response to the security challenges posed by 5G technology.