德国外交关系理事会-混合威胁的景观（英文）-2021.3-58页_2mb

Summary of "The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model"

Core Content

This report, authored by Giannopoulos, Smith, and Theocharidou, presents a conceptual model for understanding Hybrid Threats, a complex and evolving phenomenon that has increasingly shaped the security landscape in Europe. The model is developed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), aiming to provide a scientific basis for policy decisions at the EU and NATO levels.

Main Objectives

The report has three main objectives:

1. Establish a common understanding of Hybrid Threats among various stakeholders, including policymakers, practitioners, and researchers.
2. Support the design of effective actions to counter Hybrid Threats, focusing on detection, attribution, and resilience building.
3. Provide a foundation for future academic, political, and operational development of the Hybrid Threats concept.

Key Components of the Conceptual Model

The model is built around four pillars:

• Actors: Both state and non-state entities that engage in Hybrid Threats, with their strategic objectives and methods of operation.
• Domains: The areas where Hybrid Threats can be applied, including Infrastructure, Cyber, Space, Economy, Military/Defence, Culture, Social/Societal, Public Administration, Legal, Intelligence, Diplomacy, Political, and Information.
• Tools: The various methods and techniques used by actors to exert influence or cause harm, such as disinformation, cyber attacks, and economic coercion.
• Phases: The lifecycle of Hybrid Threats, including Priming, Destabilization through Operations and Campaigns, and Coercion through Hybrid Warfare.

Strategic Actors

The report explores the strategic thinking of key actors, particularly Russia and China, and how their approaches to influence and power projection are reflected in their hybrid strategies. It also examines non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations, and how they may be used by states to achieve strategic goals.

• State Actors: Include traditional and non-traditional actors, with a focus on how states operate through non-state entities.
• Russian Strategic Thinking: Emphasizes the use of hybrid tactics to challenge Western values and institutions.
• Chinese Strategic Culture: Highlights the role of influence and soft power in achieving geopolitical objectives.
• Non-State Actors: Diverse in nature, including both hostile and benign entities, and often used as tools by state actors.

Domains and Tools

The report identifies 13 domains as the key areas where Hybrid Threats can manifest:

1. Infrastructure
2. Cyber
3. Space
4. Economy
5. Military/Defence
6. Culture
7. Social/Societal
8. Public Administration
9. Legal
10. Intelligence
11. Diplomacy
12. Political
13. Information

These domains are analyzed for their relevance in the context of Hybrid Threats, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive approach that integrates both civil and military thinking.

The tools used by actors are not listed exhaustively, but rather serve as examples of the types of methods that can be employed. The goal is to offer a flexible framework that can be adapted to the needs of different stakeholders.

Phases of Hybrid Threats

The model outlines three key phases:

1. Priming: The initial phase where actors prepare and set the stage for future actions.
2. Destabilization through Operations and Campaigns: The phase where actors actively engage in actions to disrupt stability.
3. Coercion through Hybrid Warfare: The phase where the threat escalates and becomes more direct, often involving military or cyber actions.

The model emphasizes that Hybrid Threats do not always follow a linear path, and that escalation may not be inevitable. This allows for a more nuanced understanding of how threats can be managed before they reach a critical stage.

Importance of the Conceptual Model

• The model validates its framework through case studies and literature analysis.
• It is not based solely on past experience, but is designed to be future-proof.
• It aims to avoid conceptual handcuffing by providing a flexible and adaptable framework.
• It supports early detection, risk management, and resilience building.
• It is intended to complement existing policy initiatives and provide a scientific rationale for future actions.

Conclusion

The conceptual model is a key tool for understanding and responding to Hybrid Threats in a complex and multi-faceted environment. It is expected to serve as a blueprint for policymakers, practitioners, and researchers to enhance awareness, communication, and resilience at both national and European levels.

Key Information

• Authors: Giannopoulos, Smith, Theocharidou
• Institutions: Joint Research Centre (JRC), European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE)
• Publication Year: 2021
• ISBN: 978-92-76-29819-9
• DOI: 10.2760/44985
• JRC Reference: JRC123305
• Contact Information:
  • JRC: Georgios Giannopoulos, Ispra, Italy
  • Hybrid CoE: Hanna Smith, Helsinki, Finland

References and Further Research

The report highlights the need for further research in areas such as emerging and disruptive technologies, and encourages end users to propose additional tools and refine the model based on their specific needs. It also serves as a complement to ongoing efforts and existing policy initiatives in the EU and NATO.