2011年-IMF国际货币组织全球_United_Arab_Emirates_Selected_Issues_and_Statistical_Appendix_69页_1mb

Summary of the United Arab Emirates: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix

Core Content

This document is a staff report prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) focusing on government-related entities (GREs), financial sector stability, and fiscal policy and coordination. The report was finalized on April 6, 2011, and aims to analyze the risks posed by GREs, the impact of Dubai's debt restructuring, and the broader implications for the UAE's fiscal and financial systems.

Main Risks Posed by GREs

Introduction

• GREs have been pivotal in driving the UAE's economic growth and development.
• The UAE economy is dominated by entities owned by the Government of Dubai (GD), the Government of Abu Dhabi (GAD), or the ruling family via major holding companies.
• During 2004–08, GREs benefited from government transfers and extensive borrowing, assuming an implicit government guarantee.

Dubai's Debt Restructuring

• Market Risk:

  • The announcement of Dubai World (DW) debt standstill led to a sharp decline in market conditions.
  • Yields on Dubai government bonds and Sukuk bonds rose significantly in 2009–10, peaking at over 10%.
  • The submission of a restructuring plan in March 2010 led to a sustained downward trend in yields, although they remained above pre-crisis levels.

• Fiscal Risk:

  • The debt restructuring of DW increased Dubai's sovereign debt, which rose to $36 billion by end-2010 (34% of Dubai and northern emirates GDP).
  • This increase has implications for the banking sector and financial markets.

• Financial Risk via Local Banks:

  • Dubai banks were significantly exposed to GREs, with 16% of their loans tied to GREs.
  • DW's restructured debt involved $14.4 billion, of which $60% was owed by Dubai banks.
  • Provisions on DW restructured loans totaled $500 million, with an average haircut of 9%.
  • Dubai Holding and ICD also faced substantial debt restructuring, with significant portions owed to local banks.

Going Forward: Main Risks

• Both Dubai and Abu Dhabi face rollover risks due to a large portion of their debt maturing in 2011–12.
• Dubai's total debt is estimated at $112.95 billion (102.6% of 2010 GDP), with the majority coming from Dubai Inc.
• Abu Dhabi's total debt is $104.01 billion (54.8% of 2010 GDP), with most of it stemming from GREs.
• A significant portion of Dubai's debt will mature in 2014–15, creating potential bunching risks.
• The real estate sector overhang poses a risk to the sovereign balance sheet, local banks, and capital markets due to potential contingent liabilities.

Main Sources of Contingent Risk

• Several GREs in Dubai and Abu Dhabi are identified as sources of contingent risk.
• These entities have weak governance structures, and many do not publish annual reports, audited balance sheets, or income statements.
• Dubai GREs:
  • Profit margins declined to -0.17 in Q3 2010 from 0.18 a year earlier, with the largest losses concentrated in DCHOG.
  • Excluding DCHOG, profit margins were slightly up from the previous year.
• Abu Dhabi GREs:
  • Average profit margins for a sample of 18 GREs were slightly down, with Mubadala being the main exception due to significant government capital injections.

Key Policies and Implications

• The government has injected capital into some GREs, such as Dubai Holding and Dubai Inc.
• The Central Bank of the UAE (CBU) and Government of Dubai (GD) have extended support to GREs, including a $10 billion loan to DW in 2009 and further support in 2010.
• Market access for the UAE sovereign and GREs was significantly affected, with the GD regaining access in September 2010 at higher costs.
• The IMF emphasizes the need for careful debt management and financial stability measures to mitigate the risks from GREs.

Statistical Appendix Highlights

• The statistical appendix includes a wide range of data on GDP, debt, fiscal operations, and financial sector indicators for the UAE from 2002 to 2010.
• Sectoral distribution of GDP and employment, oil and gas production and prices, and balance of payments data are provided.
• Debt maturity profiles, liquidity coverage ratios, and real estate exposures are also detailed, showing the significant role of GREs in the financial system.

Conclusion

• The report highlights the financial and fiscal risks associated with GREs in the UAE, particularly in Dubai.
• It underscores the importance of transparency, governance reform, and effective debt management to ensure the stability of the financial system and the sovereign balance sheet.
• The IMF recommends policies to manage GRE risk, including enhancing transparency, improving governance, and maintaining fiscal sustainability.