史汀生中心-走向成熟的防务伙伴关系：来自美印战略对话的启示（英）-2021.11-27页_1mb

Summary of "Toward a Mature Defense Partnership"

Core Content

The Toward a Mature Defense Partnership report, published by the Stimson Center in November 2021, analyzes the evolving U.S.-India defense relationship through insights from a multi-year strategic dialogue. The dialogue, held virtually in 2020 and 2021, involved over 20 hours of group discussions and 40 hours of individual follow-ups, engaging experts from both countries across military, diplomatic, and academic domains. The report focuses on enhancing defense cooperation, aligning threat assessments, and navigating geopolitical complexities in the Indo-Pacific.

Main Points

U.S. Government Recommendations

• Joint Leadership Statement on Defense Tech: Clear leadership and cabinet-level oversight are necessary to advance defense technology cooperation. A high-profile initiative, such as a joint supercomputer project, could serve as a flagship effort to boost R&D, economic, and intelligence collaboration.

• Disarm CAATSA Landmine: The U.S. should either provide India with an enduring waiver under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) or apply symbolic sanctions with prior consultation to avoid political backlash.

• Rhetorical Adjustments: U.S. rhetoric should emphasize discreet, non-confrontational cooperation with India on China-related issues, such as intelligence, maritime security, and cybersecurity, while reinforcing India’s sovereignty and development goals.

Department of Defense Insights

• Joint Intelligence Assessment: The U.S. and India should conduct more frequent and comprehensive joint intelligence assessments to align on regional threats and strategies. A dedicated center at INDOPACOM could facilitate this process.

• Revitalize Defense Tech Partnership: India expects more visible success in defense technology cooperation, beyond prototypes. The Pentagon should leverage entities like the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to engage with Indian cities and industries, while expanding R&D and talent exchange programs.

• Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and Infrastructure Investments: The U.S. should support India’s modernization through EDA programs, helping it acquire advanced platforms like the RQ-4 Global Hawk and E-8 JSTARS. Infrastructure development in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, such as ports and telecom systems, should also be prioritized.

U.S. Navy Recommendations

• Increase Naval Exercises: The U.S. and India should conduct more frequent and complex naval exercises, including P-8 joint operations, ASW readiness evaluations, and sensor system deployments in the Bay of Bengal.

• Maritime Security as Public Goods: U.S. support for India’s maritime domain awareness (MDA) should focus on delivering public goods, such as counter-narcotics and humanitarian assistance exercises, to build regional trust and cooperation.

• Integration Over Interoperability: India prefers the language of "integration" rather than "interoperability" in defense cooperation, emphasizing autonomy and avoiding perceptions of dependence.

• Medium-Term Dialogue: A more strategic, long-term dialogue involving mid-level officials could foster deeper discussions on doctrines, command and control, and undersea warfare, which are currently underrepresented in bilateral interactions.

India's Strategic Outlook

Shift in Strategy Post-2020 Ladakh Crisis

• Bolder Signals: India is more open to military cooperation with the U.S. and the Quad, though it remains cautious about direct confrontation with China.
• Continued Entrapment Fears: Despite these signals, India remains hesitant to fully align with U.S. strategic priorities, fearing entrapment or loss of autonomy.
• Different Sense of Urgency: India does not share the same level of urgency as the U.S. regarding maritime threats, prioritizing continental security concerns instead.

Threat Environment and Regional Dilemmas

• Pakistan: Seen as a Chinese proxy, the ceasefire in Kashmir is viewed as temporary and not a strategic shift. India remains wary of Pakistan’s alignment with China.
• China: PLA incursions and territorial claims on the Sino-Indian border have created long-term security dilemmas for India, which fears being outmaneuvered in the region.
• Afghanistan: Indian participants view spillovers from Afghanistan as a more immediate threat than China’s actions in the South China Sea. They are concerned about U.S. ties with Pakistan and the Quad’s lack of engagement.
• Indian Ocean Region (IOR): India is skeptical of China’s naval capabilities in the IOR and continues to prioritize continental theater for resource allocation.

India’s Tension Between Self-Help and External Help

• Goldilocks Dilemma: India seeks a balance of U.S. support that strengthens its self-reliance without undermining its regional leadership.
• Gradualist Approach: India prefers a slow, incremental path to defense cooperation, emphasizing joint assessments and intelligence sharing over immediate military collaboration.
• Sovereignty Concerns: Indian strategists are wary of any moves that could infringe on their autonomy, even in areas like cyber and naval interoperability.

Challenges to Defense Modernization

• Indigenization: India prioritizes domestic production, such as the Tejas fighter, over foreign procurement, even at the cost of some short-term military effectiveness.
• Defense Budgets: Slow economic recovery and limited defense spending will constrain India’s modernization efforts, especially in acquiring advanced systems.
• Theater Commands: While joint commands may improve efficiency, inter-service rivalries could delay procurement and integration processes.
• Systems Integration: India is reluctant to fully integrate its platforms into interconnected networks, preferring improvised solutions over comprehensive interoperability.

Regional Policies and Strategic Frameworks

• ASEAN Centrality: India’s focus on ASEAN as a central forum is more about complementing than replacing the Quad, aiming to promote regional stability and public goods.
• U.S. Role in India’s Neighborhood: India expects the U.S. to engage with the region through New Delhi, rather than independently, to avoid perceived encroachment on its sphere of influence.
• India's "India First" Model: India prefers a self-reliant model of cooperation, emphasizing economic and technological partnerships over direct military involvement.

Conclusion

The report underscores the need for a more mature and strategic U.S.-India defense partnership, one that balances cooperation with autonomy, aligns threat perceptions, and addresses India’s continental security concerns. It calls for enhanced dialogue, joint intelligence assessments, and targeted support in defense technology and infrastructure, while respecting India’s preference for gradual integration and sovereignty.