2012年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_National_Commitments_Compliance_and_the_Future_of_the_Kyoto_Protocol_8页_252kb

Summary of National Commitments, Compliance and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol

Core Content

The document discusses the unresolved issues surrounding the future of the Kyoto Protocol, particularly the lack of post-2012 emission reduction targets for developed countries and the effectiveness of the Protocol's compliance regime. It emphasizes that while the Kyoto Protocol is the only legally binding international instrument for emission reductions, the legal form of commitments may not be as critical as the actual credibility and enforceability of those commitments. The analysis highlights the need for a more robust compliance system and a shift in focus from legal form to the practical implications of commitments.

Main Points

• Kyoto Protocol's Legal Status and Future
  The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, is the only legally binding climate agreement. However, its first commitment period ends in 2012, and there are currently no binding targets for developed countries beyond that. This creates uncertainty about the Protocol's future and the potential for a gap between commitment periods.

• Negotiation Framework and Tracks
  The two-track negotiation process, initiated by the Bali Action Plan in 2007, includes:

  • AWG-KP: Focuses on further commitments for Annex I parties (developed countries).
  • AWG-LCA: Addresses enhanced mitigation actions for both developed and developing countries.
    These tracks were extended until the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) in Cancún, 2010.

• Compliance Mechanism
  The Kyoto Protocol includes a Compliance Committee with two branches:

  • Facilitative Branch: Provides early warning and recommendations to parties for potential non-compliance.
  • Enforcement Branch: Reviews compliance ex post and applies consequences for non-compliance, such as emission unit deductions, requirement to submit a compliance plan, and suspension from trading.

• Consequences of Non-Compliance
  The Protocol's compliance system has limited effectiveness:

  • Consequences are not binding unless an amendment is adopted and ratified.
  • Non-compliance can lead to reduced emission targets in future periods, as non-compliant parties may seek to negotiate lower targets.
  • The compliance system is not fully functional until after the end of the commitment period, and the Facilitative Branch lacks the power to initiate early warnings independently.

• Role of the Base Year and Timing
  The base year of 1990, used for calculating emission reductions, has had a significant impact on the achievement of targets due to historical factors such as the collapse of East German industries and the shift from coal to gas in the UK. The timing of commitment periods and the level of ambition also influence compliance performance.

• EU's Position and Domestic Legislation
  The EU has shifted its stance, supporting a single legally binding instrument that incorporates elements of the Kyoto Protocol and builds on the Copenhagen Accord. The EU's domestic legal framework, including the 2008 energy and climate package, provides a model for legally binding domestic targets that can enhance credibility.

• Credibility Over Legal Form
  The document argues that the legal form of commitments is less important than their credibility and enforceability. Non-binding pledges, if publicly committed and supported by domestic policy, can still carry reputational costs and influence national action. The Copenhagen Accord is seen as a platform for states to 'hook' their pledges into an international framework.

• Need for Reform
  The compliance system needs reform, particularly the Facilitative Branch, to improve early warning and support for compliance. A shift in focus from legal form to a credible and enforceable process could enhance the effectiveness of climate negotiations.

Key Information

• The Kyoto Protocol is the only legally binding climate agreement, but its compliance system is not robust.
• Non-compliance can lead to consequences such as emission unit deductions, compliance plans, and trade suspensions, but these are not binding unless an amendment is adopted.
• The Facilitative Branch lacks the power to trigger early warnings, making the compliance system reactive rather than proactive.
• The EU is a key player in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and is considering raising its 2020 emission reduction target from 20% to 30%.
• The Copenhagen Accord is not legally binding but serves as a platform for states to announce commitments.
• Reputational costs play a significant role in compliance, even for non-binding targets.
• The Bali Action Plan and subsequent negotiations have not led to a binding agreement on a second commitment period, leading to uncertainty about the Protocol's future.

Conclusion

The document concludes that the Kyoto Protocol's compliance system is not as strong as it appears, and that the focus should shift from legal form to the credibility and enforceability of commitments. It suggests that the Cancún negotiations should prioritize a framework that ensures transparency, accountability, and public commitment, rather than solely on the legal bindingness of the agreement. The EU's example illustrates the importance of domestic legislation and strategic planning in enhancing the credibility of international climate commitments.