2012年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_Paper_tigers_or_sleeping_beauties_National_Parliaments_in_the_post_17页_474kb

Summary: National Parliaments in the Post-Lisbon European Political System

Core Content

The Lisbon Treaty (2009) introduced new mechanisms to enhance the role of national parliaments in the European Union's decision-making process. These mechanisms are designed to increase democratic legitimacy by allowing national parliaments to scrutinize EU legislation through the subsidiarity check system, which includes the 'yellow' and 'orange' card procedures. Despite these provisions, the effectiveness of national parliaments in exercising their new powers remains uncertain, with many still functioning as "paper tigers" due to lack of coordination and limited political engagement.

Main Views and Key Points

1. Role of National Parliaments

• National parliaments are tasked with "contributing actively to the good functioning of the Union."
• They are empowered to monitor EU legislation for subsidiarity and proportionality breaches.
• They have the right to veto certain EU legislative changes, particularly those involving the passerelle clause.

2. New Instruments Introduced by Lisbon

• Yellow Card: If a third of national parliaments (or a quarter in justice, freedom, and security) indicate a subsidiarity breach, the proposal must be reviewed. The Commission is not required to withdraw the proposal but must provide a Communication explaining its decision.
• Orange Card: If more than half of national parliaments find a subsidiarity breach, the proposal is blocked unless the Commission provides a reasoned opinion. The European Parliament and Council then decide whether to proceed with the legislation.
• Passerelle Clause: Allows the European Council to change the decision-making mechanism in the Council from unanimity to majority voting, or from special to ordinary legislative procedures, but requires unanimity for such a change. Any individual national chamber can veto the use of this clause within six months of the proposal.

3. Challenges in Implementation

• Technical Challenges: The eight-week deadline for national parliaments to respond to proposals is a constraint. It does not include August holidays, and the definition of subsidiarity is still unclear.
• Political Challenges: There is limited political interest in engaging early in the decision-making process. Most national parliaments have focused on individual powers rather than collective action.
• Coordination Issues: In bicameral systems, the lack of clarity on the roles of chambers and the need to coordinate with regional parliaments presents significant hurdles.

4. Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation

• The Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees (COSAC) has been a key platform for information exchange and cooperation among national parliaments.
• The Inter-parliamentary EU Information Exchange (IPEX) facilitates electronic communication of EU-related information.
• The political dialogue with the European Commission is bilateral, and there is uneven participation across member states.

5. Preparations and Try-Outs

• Between 2005 and 2009, COSAC conducted eight subsidiarity checks as a preparation exercise for the Lisbon Treaty.
• These checks involved only two legislative proposals each year, and 35 out of 40 national parliaments participated.
• Despite the capacity to participate, the system did not trigger any yellow or orange card procedures. The closest attempt was on the 3rd Railway Package, where 30% of national parliaments indicated a problem, which was below the threshold for triggering the yellow card.

Conclusion

The Lisbon Treaty has enhanced the role of national parliaments in the EU, but their collective effectiveness remains limited. The potential for influence exists, but coordination, political will, and clear definitions are necessary for these powers to be fully realized. The individual focus of national parliaments suggests that they are still in the early stages of adapting to their new responsibilities. The future success of the EU's democratic governance depends on the development of inter-parliamentary cooperation and the effective use of the new tools introduced by the Treaty.