20220520-欧洲中央银行-央行数字货币设计的统一框架（英）_52页_918kb

This paper analyzes the optimal design of central bank digital currency (CBDC) using a dynamic general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions. The central bank can influence CBDC through remuneration, collateral haircuts, and quantity constraints to steer macroeconomic outcomes, credit allocation, and welfare. The key finding is that restrictive CBDC policies reduce welfare by constraining investment but can mitigate bank disintermediation if substitution between CBDC and bank deposits is low. In contrast, less restrictive policies increase welfare but may lead to significant bank lending reductions. Welfare gains from CBDC depend critically on the substitutability of its forms with bank deposits; low substitutability yields substantial benefits, while high substitutability diminishes them. The model shows that parameters like the spread between deposit and lending rates, haircut sizes, and quantity caps can effectively manage disintermediation, but they must be calibrated based on substitutability to maximize efficiency. Overall, CBDC improves resource allocation but risks altering banking structures, requiring careful policy calibration.