2009年-世界发展银行全球_Anti-money_Laundering_and_Combating_the_Financing_of_Terrorism___Pakistan_262页_1mb

Summary of the AML/CFT Mutual Evaluation Report on Pakistan (9 July 2009)

Core Content

This report is a mutual evaluation of Pakistan's anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) regime, conducted by the World Bank and endorsed by the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) on 9 July 2009. It is based on the FATF Forty Recommendations (2003) and Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (2001), using the AML/CFT assessment methodology updated in 2008.

The evaluation covers Pakistan's legal and institutional framework, preventive measures in the financial and non-financial sectors, and international cooperation. It provides an overview of the country's compliance with the recommendations, identifies gaps, and offers recommendations to strengthen the system.

Main Findings

1. Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks

• Pakistan faces significant risks of money laundering and even greater risks of terrorist financing.
• Corruption, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism are major predicate crimes.
• Criminals in Pakistan are using real estate, corporate entities, trade, and informal channels for money laundering.
• Terrorist financing sources include proceeds from crime (e.g., bank robberies, kidnaps for ransom, and drug proceeds from Afghanistan), as well as misuse of charities and cash couriers.

2. Legal Framework

• Money Laundering: Pakistan has criminalized money laundering via the Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance (AMLO), enacted in September 2007. The law provides a broad definition of the physical element of ML but lacks a comprehensive list of predicate offences.
• Terrorist Financing: The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997 partially criminalizes TF, but Pakistan has not ratified the UN Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism Financing.
• Criminal Liability: Legal persons are held to the same liability as natural persons under AMLO, but there is no established practice of prosecuting legal persons directly for ML/TF.
• Forfeiture Regime: AMLO provides a conviction-based recovery mechanism, which is supplemented by specific provisions for narcotics and corruption. However, the assessors recommend reviewing the drafting of the forfeiture regime to reduce legal challenges.

3. Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)

• Pakistan established the Financial Intelligence Unit (FMU) in December 2007 under AMLO.
• The FMU is mandated to receive, analyze, and disseminate Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), but it lacks sufficient operational independence, resources, and staffing.
• There is a significant backlog of STRs, and the FMU does not have the tools to effectively analyze them.
• The FMU's participation in international cooperation is limited due to restrictive conditions and procedures.

4. Enforcement and Prosecution

• The agencies designated for investigating ML and TF have the necessary powers, but there is a lack of effective prosecution and investigation.
• There is no clear public policy or centralized leadership on ML/TF prosecution, and the informal coordination mechanisms are not sufficient to address institutional fragmentation.
• Prosecutors and judges need training on the autonomy of the ML offence.

5. Preventive Measures in the Financial Sector

• The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has implemented preventive measures, including:
  • Customer Due Diligence (CDD) requirements for banks, exchange companies, and microfinance institutions.
  • Enhanced due diligence for high-risk customers, including Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).
  • A requirement to identify and verify beneficial owners.
  • Record-keeping and wire transfer rules.
• The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has also issued CDD regulations, but they are not comprehensive enough.
• Both SBP and SECP have not fully implemented all CDD requirements, including the verification of beneficial owners, ongoing monitoring, and handling of cases where CDD is not satisfactory.
• SBP has introduced a more stringent CDD framework in March 2009, which has been partially mirrored by SECP in April 2009, but enforcement remains a challenge.

6. Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBP)

• DNFBP sectors, such as real estate, legal services, and insurance, have not fully adopted AML/CFT preventive measures.
• There is a lack of clarity on the definition of high-risk customers and the scope of enhanced due diligence.
• The assessment team recommends further clarification of simplified due diligence measures and the adoption of more stringent requirements for DNFBP sectors.

7. International Cooperation

• Pakistan has the legal basis to implement UNSCR 1267 and 1373, but the mechanisms for freezing assets are limited and not comprehensive.
• The use of Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) under the United Nations (Security Council) Act 1948 allows for asset freezing, but there are no sanctions for non-compliance.
• Pakistan has proscribed 22 domestic organizations under the ATA, including five listed by the UN, but there is no guidance for financial institutions on how to implement freezing obligations.

8. Institutional and Legal Challenges

• The current institutional arrangements for ML/TF investigation and prosecution are fragmented and lack coordination.
• The legal system does not provide a clear distinction between ML and predicate crimes, and there is a need for a national AML/CFT strategy with centralized leadership.
• The capacity to engage in mutual legal assistance and administrative cooperation is limited due to legal and procedural constraints.

Key Recommendations

• Implement a comprehensive ML/TF risk analysis.
• Adopt a national AML/CFT strategy with high-level, centralized leadership.
• Clarify and strengthen the legal framework for ML and TF, including expanding predicate offences and ensuring autonomy of ML prosecution.
• Enhance the capacity and independence of the FMU, including better staffing, budget, and international cooperation mechanisms.
• Improve the implementation of CDD and record-keeping requirements in both the financial and DNFBP sectors.
• Provide clear guidance and training for law enforcement and prosecution agencies on the prosecution of ML and TF.
• Strengthen the legal basis for freezing and confiscating assets used for terrorist financing.
• Expand the scope of AML/CFT preventive measures to include all relevant sectors and entities.
• Ensure that the legal framework allows for the prosecution of legal persons and covers all types of assets and organizations involved in ML and TF.

Compliance and Effectiveness

• The level of compliance with AML/CFT recommendations is not sufficient to address the risks and threats.
• There is a need for more rigorous enforcement and implementation of the preventive measures.
• The FMU has not effectively fulfilled its role due to lack of resources and independence.
• The number of prosecutions and convictions under ML and TF laws is not proportional to the prevalence of these crimes.

Conclusion

Pakistan has made some progress in establishing an AML/CFT framework, but significant gaps remain in legal clarity, institutional coordination, and enforcement. The report emphasizes the need for a more robust and systematic approach to combating ML and TF, including a national strategy, enhanced legal and institutional frameworks, and stronger implementation and enforcement mechanisms.