2007年-世界发展银行全球_Anti-Money_Laundering_and_Combating_the_Financing_of_Terrorism___Republic_of_Uganda_82页_932kb

Summary of the AML/CFT Assessment of the Republic of Uganda (August 2007)

Core Content

This report is a detailed assessment of Uganda's Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime, conducted by the World Bank under the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) in 2005. It evaluates Uganda's legal and institutional framework, preventive measures, and compliance with FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations.

Main Points

1. Legal and Institutional Framework

• Uganda has made some progress in establishing an AML/CFT regime, but it has not yet fully met international standards.
• The Bank of Uganda (BOU) is responsible for supervising financial institutions and micro-finance deposit-taking institutions (MDIs).
• The Uganda Anti-Money Laundering Committee (UAMLC) was established to coordinate AML/CFT efforts, with the BOU as its chair.
• The Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) exists but is limited in scope, covering only "Al Qaeda" from the UN Terrorist Lists.
• The Financial Institutions Act (FIA, 2004) and the Micro-Finance Deposit-taking Institutions Act (MDI Act, 2004) provide a legal basis for AML/CFT supervision, but the AML law has not been passed yet.
• The AML/CFT Bill 2004 was approved by the Cabinet but has not been introduced to Parliament due to constitutional issues and lack of clear timelines.

2. Preventive Measures

Financial Institutions

• The BOU has issued AML Guidelines (2002) and Foreign Exchange Bureau Guidelines (2003).
• These guidelines include Customer Due Diligence (CDD) requirements, restrictions on anonymous accounts, and procedures for reporting suspicious transactions.
• However, enforcement of these measures is limited due to the absence of a comprehensive AML law.
• The BOU has enforcement powers under the FIA, allowing it to inspect, search, and freeze accounts of unlicensed financial institutions.
• Despite these measures, procedures for freezing, unfreezing, and forfeiture are not clearly defined in the law.

Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs)

• There is no AML or CFT supervision for DNFBPs such as lawyers, accountants, casinos, real estate agents, and precious metal dealers.
• The Customs Service identified duty fraud and smuggling (especially of cigarettes, petrol, and drugs) as major threats to revenue and AML compliance.
• The sale of Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) to Stanbic Bank has improved the banking structure and increased access to financial services.

Legal Persons and Non-Profit Organizations

• Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are registered with the National Board for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO Board).
• The registration process is manual and under-resourced, with limited capacity for vetting or supervision.
• The NGO Board lacks sufficient funding and authority to implement public awareness and training programs.

3. Risk and Vulnerabilities

• Uganda is a cash-based economy, with only a small proportion of the population having bank accounts or insurance policies.
• This makes the formal financial sector vulnerable to AML/CFT risks, as cash transactions are not easily traceable.
• Cross-border cash movement is encouraged by the acceptance of Ugandan shillings in neighboring countries, increasing the risk of illicit funds flowing through Uganda.
• Organized crime groups are involved in smuggling, duty fraud, and drug trafficking, often using Uganda as a transit point.
• Arms and human trafficking are also significant issues, particularly involving Somalia, southern Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

4. Compliance with FATF Recommendations

• The AML/CFT Bill 2004 is not yet in Parliament, and there is no clear timeline for its enactment.
• The FIA 2004 includes provisions for AML/CFT, but the draft AML law does not fully comply with FATF Recommendation 1, which requires the inclusion of predicate offenses.
• The BOU has not yet used the FIA to enforce AML/CFT measures, and the AML guidelines are not yet fully implemented.
• The Anti-Terrorism Act lacks coverage of other terrorist entities on the UN list and has no clear timeline for amendments.
• The National Task Force (NTF) and Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JAT) exist but are under-resourced and lack clarity in their roles and responsibilities.

Key Recommendations

1. Pass the AML/CFT Bill 2004 as soon as possible to align with international standards.
2. Define and implement predicate offenses in the AML law to ensure full compliance with FATF Recommendations.
3. Establish a clear timeline for the amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Act to include all relevant terrorist entities.
4. Improve the legal status and funding of the UAMLC to enable it to carry out its functions effectively.
5. Enhance the capacity of the NGO Board to supervise and vet NGOs, and to manage the registration process.
6. Develop a comprehensive national strategy for AML/CFT, including a detailed vulnerability assessment.
7. Conduct public education campaigns to raise awareness of AML/CFT principles among Parliamentarians and the general public.
8. Improve the AML/CFT framework for DNFBPs, including casinos, real estate agents, and precious metal dealers.
9. Implement a national identity system to improve the ability to verify customer identities and prevent identity fraud.

Conclusion

Uganda has made some progress in establishing AML/CFT frameworks, but it remains non-compliant with international standards due to the lack of a comprehensive AML law and inadequate enforcement mechanisms. The country is vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing due to its cash-based economy, geographic location, and lack of effective supervision for certain sectors. The UAMLC and BOU have played a key role in AML/CFT efforts, but more support, funding, and legislative action are needed to ensure full compliance and effective implementation.