2009年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Review_of_the_Experience_with_the_Policy_Support_Instrument_26页_662kb

Summary of the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) Review

I. Introduction

The Policy Support Instrument (PSI) was introduced in October 2005 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to support low-income countries that do not require financial assistance but wish to engage with the Fund to consolidate macroeconomic stability and pursue second-generation reforms. The PSI is intended for mature stabilizers, defined by four macroeconomic criteria: reasonable growth performance, low underlying inflation, adequate international reserves, and initial steps toward debt sustainability. It also emphasizes institutional and policy development. The review, conducted by the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, aimed to evaluate the PSI's implementation against its goals and expectations, using data from seven approved PSIs across six countries.

The review focused on four dimensions:

• Characteristics of PSI users
• Program design and implementation
• Comparative macroeconomic performance
• Perceptions of the PSI's role

It also considered possible modifications to the PSI and its role within the broader context of the Fund's new architecture for lending to low-income countries (LICs). The review concluded that the PSI has generally been used by its target group, with some exceptions like Nigeria, which still met most of the criteria.

II. Have PSI Users Been Mature Stabilizers?

• The PSI is intended for mature stabilizers, defined by:

  • Reasonable growth performance
  • Low underlying inflation (comparable to major trading partners)
  • Adequate international reserves
  • Debt sustainability (external and net domestic)

• A quantitative approach was used to assess whether PSI users generally met these criteria:

  • Comparator countries were selected based on meeting or exceeding thresholds for these indicators
  • These thresholds were based on averages or conventional rules of thumb among PRGF-eligible members
  • Institutional quality was also considered, with countries below the mid-point of the World Bank’s CPIA index excluded

• Table 1 shows the list of comparator countries, including all but one of the PSI users (Nigeria, which did not meet the institutional quality criterion). The group includes:

  • 6 surveillance-only countries
  • 8 PRGF comparator countries

• Despite some concerns about countries prone to policy slippages, Nigeria and Senegal demonstrated strong implementation of structural reforms, addressing these concerns.

• The PSI has not totally displaced other program engagement forms among mature stabilizers. Some countries continued with PRGF arrangements even after the PSI became available.

• The sample size remains small, and conclusions should be viewed as tentative due to limited statistical power.

III. Have PSI-Supported Programs Been Designed and Implemented Successfully?

A. Expectations for PSI on Program Design

• The Executive Board expected PSI-supported programs to follow the same conditionality standards as PRGF-supported programs, particularly upper credit tranche conditionality, which aims to correct balance of payments imbalances and enable repayment to the Fund.
• Documentation for PSI programs was expected to be more concise than for financial arrangements.

B. Comparison with PRGF

• PSI-supported programs had fewer conditions per review than contemporaneous PRGF-supported programs (about 25% fewer), but similar numbers to previous PRGF programs for the same countries.
• Adherence to structural conditionality was comparable to PRGF-supported programs, indicating that the PSI has not led to weaker implementation.
• The fixed review schedule under the PSI has been effective in promoting policy discipline, as all reviews were completed on time and no additional waivers were needed.

C. Technical Assistance

• PSI users had more technical assistance (TA) projects than other comparator countries, with an average of 6.4 completed TA projects per country compared to 5 for other comparator countries.
• Expenditure management was the most common focus of TA projects for PSI users, accounting for nearly 50% of all projects, while PRGF countries had 25%, and other comparator countries had <5%.

D. Conciseness of Documentation

• PSI documentation was more concise than PRGF:
  • PSI letters of intent averaged 22 pages, compared to 27–28 pages for PRGF
  • Main staff reports for PSI averaged 35 pages, compared to 42 pages for PRGF

IV. Has the PSI Led to Consolidation of Macroeconomic Performance?

• Data limitations hindered robust comparisons, as most PSI programs were in place for only 2–3 years, and macroeconomic data were available with long lags.

• Despite these limitations, PSI users performed as well as or better than other LICs in most macroeconomic indicators:

  • GDP growth, international reserve cover, and fiscal balances were stronger
  • Inflation showed little differentiation
  • Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows were notably higher in PSI countries

• The PSI appears to have contributed to macroeconomic stability and policy consolidation, without requiring the Fund's financial resources.

V. Has the PSI Met the Expectations of Low-Income Members and Donors?

• PSI users and donors generally expressed positive views on the instrument:

  • Most PSI users felt the PSI was more appropriate to their needs than PRGF
  • Donors considered the PSI useful in aid decision-making, with 40% stating it was more useful than a surveillance-only relationship

• Other low-income members and private investors also viewed the PSI favorably:

  • 75% of non-PSI users found it attractive as an alternative to surveillance-only relationships
  • 50% considered it more attractive than low-access PRGF arrangements

• The policy support role of the PSI was highly valued:

  • Users reported improved policy dialogue with the IMF and country ownership of programs
  • Technical assistance and monitoring helped improve macroeconomic management and government reforms

• The October 2008 modifications to the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) made the PSI more attractive to users, as the PSI now supports the transition to ESF financing without requiring termination of the program.

VI. Conclusions and Issues for Discussion

• The PSI has largely been used by its target group, i.e., mature stabilizers, and appears to have fulfilled its goals.

• The fixed review schedule has been effective in promoting policy discipline and program adherence.

• Documentation for PSI programs is more concise than for financial arrangements.

• Technical assistance is more focused and extensive for PSI users.

• The PSI has not displaced other Fund engagement forms, and it remains a valuable complement to financial instruments.

• The review highlights the need for continued monitoring and potential refinements to the PSI, especially in light of the Fund's broader reforms to LIC lending facilities. However, the PSI is seen as a successful and voluntary tool for policy engagement.