2012年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_A_border_tax_to_protect_the_global_environment_5页_168kb

报告摘要

A Border Tax to Protect the Global Environment? Summary

Core Content

This commentary by Daniel Gros explores the welfare implications of carbon import tariffs from a global perspective, rather than focusing solely on competitiveness and carbon leakage. It argues that such tariffs can enhance global welfare by reducing emissions from foreign production and that the proceeds from these tariffs can be used to support developing countries in reducing their carbon intensity.

Main Points

Global Welfare Focus: Climate change policies, even when implemented nationally, are aimed at protecting global welfare. Therefore, when evaluating carbon border measures, a global perspective should be adopted.
Carbon Tariff vs. Export Rebates: The analysis distinguishes between plain import tariffs and tariffs combined with export rebates. The commentary focuses on the case where no export rebate is provided, making the tariff a pure corrective measure for emissions.
Welfare Gains from Carbon Tariffs: A carbon tariff leads to a reduction in global emissions due to lower production in the rest of the world. The welfare gain is represented by the area of a parallelogram (ABCE), while the standard tariff loss is a triangle (ADE). The net welfare gain is the trapezoid (ABCD), indicating that a small carbon tariff improves global welfare.
Policy Implications: The EU, as the only major region with an active cap-and-trade system, should consider introducing carbon import tariffs. These tariffs are justified not to protect domestic industry but to support global environmental goals, which makes them potentially WTO-compliant under Article XX.
Optimal Tariff Level: In a fully specified model, the optimal carbon tariff is approximately equal to the externality in foreign production. Preliminary calculations suggest that a carbon tariff of around 9% on average would be appropriate for Chinese exports to the EU, based on current carbon prices and embodied emissions.
Political Considerations: While a significant increase in EU tariffs may be politically contentious for developing countries, the EU can mitigate this by using the tariff proceeds to assist poorer countries in reducing carbon intensity. This approach could make the policy more acceptable internationally.
Challenges with China’s Commitments: Although China has announced a target to reduce emissions intensity by 40–45% by 2020, it is unclear whether this represents a meaningful carbon price. The plan relies on investments in alternative energy rather than carbon pricing in manufacturing, which supports the economic rationale for carbon tariffs.

Key Information

Carbon Intensity of Exports: Chinese exports in 2005 embodied around 1,670 million tonnes of CO₂, or 30% of total Chinese emissions. This corresponds to a carbon intensity of about 2 tonnes of CO₂ per $1,000 of exports.
EU Carbon Price: The current EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) price is around €20–25 per tonne of CO₂, but the post-Kyoto regime will likely require a much higher price.
Tariff Impact: A carbon tariff of €40–50 per tonne (equivalent to $50–70) would imply a 9% average tariff on Chinese exports to the EU. This is much higher than the EU’s most-favoured-nation tariff rates and significantly larger than the modest reductions discussed in the Doha round.
Developing Countries’ Role: The commentary emphasizes that developing countries may not be able to reduce emissions without support. A carbon tariff could help finance emission reductions in these countries, thus contributing to global environmental protection.

Conclusion

A carbon import tariff can be a win-win for global welfare, as it reduces emissions and provides financial support to developing countries. The EU should consider implementing such a policy, not to protect its own industries, but to address global environmental challenges. The political feasibility can be improved by allocating tariff revenues to help reduce carbon intensity abroad.

References

Gros, Daniel (2009a), Global Welfare Implications of Carbon Border Taxes, CEPS Working Document No. 315.
Gros, Daniel (2009b), Why a cap-and-trade system can be bad for your health, VoxEU.org.
Gurria, Angel (2009), "Carbon has no place in global trade rules", Financial Times.
Majocchi, A. and M. Missaglia (2002), "Environmental taxes and border tax adjustment", SIEP Working Paper No. 127/2002.
McKibben, W.J. and P. Wilcoen (2008), "The Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments for Climate Policy", Brookings Institution.
Veenendaal, P. and T. Manders (2008), Border tax adjustment and the EU-ETS, CPB Document No. 171.
Weber, Christopher L., Glen Peters, Dabo Guan and Klaus Hubacek (2008), "The contribution of Chinese exports to climate change", Energy Policy.
Whalley, John (2008), Carbon, trade policy, and carbon free trade areas, VoxEU.org.
Whalley, John (2009), International trade and the feasibility of global climate change agreements, VoxEU.org.