战略与国际研究中心-Military-Balance-in-the-Middle-East_86页_265kb

Military Balance in the Middle East - VI Summary

Core Content

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the military balance in the Middle East, focusing on Israel's position relative to its regional neighbors, including Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, particularly Hezbollah. It outlines trends in military spending, arms transfers, and qualitative force developments from 1984 to 1999, as well as the concerns of Israeli military officials regarding the sustainability of Israel's military edge.

Main Points

Israel's Military Edge and Concerns

• Qualitative Edge: Israel has historically maintained a qualitative edge over its Arab neighbors, but this is increasingly under threat due to the development of advanced weapons by Arab states and the limitations of its own military capabilities in certain scenarios.
• Military Spending: Israeli military spending decreased from 1984 to 1995, with a significant drop in 1990, but increased again in 1996 and 1997. The military budget was a major concern for Israeli officials, especially with the breakdown of peace negotiations and the need for readiness in the face of potential conflict.
• Arms Deliveries: Arms deliveries to Israel were substantial from the US, Turkey, and other countries, but concerns were raised about the real cost of maintaining these capabilities and the potential for sudden transfers of advanced weapons to Arab opponents.
• Readiness Issues: There were concerns about the readiness of the IDF due to budget cuts, reduced training, and maintenance problems. The military's focus on counter-terrorism and peace negotiations has also affected its ability to prepare for conventional warfare.

Key Information

Israeli Force Trends (1984–1999)

Land Forces

• Manpower: Total active and reserve forces increased from 1985 to 1999, with active forces at 134,000 and reserves at 365,000.
• Tanks: Israel had around 4,300 main battle tanks, including 1,200 upgraded M-60s and 1,000+ Merkavas.
• APCs/OAFVs: 5,900 relatively modern armored vehicles, but no advanced types.
• Artillery: Good strength in MRLs and relatively modern artillery systems.
• Anti-Tank Weapons: Strong, but outdated half-tracks and APCs remained in service.
• Helicopters: 296 in total, with 42 AH-64A Apaches, 39 AH-1s, and 35 500D attack helicopters. Helicopter strength was at about 60% of the goal.

Air Forces

• Fighter Aircraft: F-15I, F-16s, and F-4Es were in service, with plans to acquire F-22s and RAH-66 Comanches.
• Avionics and Upgrades: Upgrades included new radar systems (EL/M-2032), LANTIRN systems, and defensive aid systems.
• Training: Concerns were raised about the training of pilots and the need for new trainers after 2000.
• UAVs: The IDF renewed its UAV systems with the Hermes 450S, which has an endurance of about 20 hours.

Naval Forces

• Submarines: Three Dolphin-class diesel-electric submarines were built in Germany, expected to be delivered by the end of 1999.
• Missile Boats: Introduction of Sa'ar-5 corvettes and mini-corvettes.
• Anti-Missile Systems: Barak system was scheduled for deployment on Sa'ar-5 boats, and sea trials of a commando-launching submarine were ongoing.

Qualitative Strengths and Weaknesses

Strengths

• Upgraded M-60 and Merkava Mk 3 tanks.
• Modern APCs and artillery.
• Good anti-tank capabilities.
• Advanced missile frigates.
• F-15I, F-16, and F-4E aircraft with upgrades.
• Combat vehicle integration systems (CVIS) for improved situational awareness.
• Arrow and I-Hawk air defense systems.
• THEL (Theater High Energy Laser) program, though on hold due to funding issues.

Weaknesses

• Obsolete and worn equipment, including 1,080 Centurions and 3,500+ half-tracks.
• Limited number of helicopters, with only 60% of the required strength.
• Limited strategic depth and reliance on conscription.
• High real cost of advanced weapons and technology.
• Vulnerability to low-intensity warfare (e.g., Hezbollah, Intifada II).
• Weakness in urban and mountain warfare.
• Vulnerability to hostage-taking and suicide bombings.
• Difficulty in responding to sudden attacks from Syria.
• High risk investment in missile defense systems.

Political and Strategic Weaknesses

• Dependence on US Aid: Israel's military budget is heavily reliant on US support, which is diminishing in real terms due to inflation.
• Internal Divisions: Extremism and internal political tensions affect military planning and readiness.
• Peace Process Uncertainty: The Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian peace process is unstable, with concerns about Egypt potentially creating a "second front."
• Lack of Allies: Only the US is a major ally in cooperative warfare.
• Nuclear Capabilities: Limited ability to exploit nuclear capabilities effectively.
• Civil Defense: Inadequate civil defense against chemical and biological attacks.
• Political Interference: Military industries suffer from political influence and inefficiency.

Concerns Over Military Budget

• Budget Cuts: In 1996, the military budget was reduced by $150 million, and in 1997 by $57 million, leading to a total of $7.2 billion.
• Readiness Issues: Concerns about the readiness of the IDF due to reduced training days and outdated equipment.
• Future Needs: The Ministry of Defense estimated that $667 million was needed annually to restore readiness levels.
• Public and Political Pressure: Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai and Chief of Staff Amnon Shahak expressed concerns over the lack of budgetary support for military readiness.

Regional Comparisons

Israel vs. Syria (1999)

• Land Forces: Israel had a significant advantage in equipment, but Syria's force size and modernization efforts posed a challenge.
• Air Forces: Israel had more advanced aircraft and systems, but Syria's military modernization was a concern.
• Naval Forces: Israel had more modern naval capabilities, including advanced missile boats and submarines.

Israel vs. Jordan (1999)

• Land Forces: Similar to Syria, Jordan had a smaller force but was improving.
• Air Forces: Jordan's air force was less capable than Israel's.
• Naval Forces: Jordan's navy was limited and not a major threat.

Israel vs. Egypt (1999)

• Land Forces: Egypt had parity with Israel in tanks, APCs, and aircraft.
• Air Forces: Egypt's air force was considered a potential threat due to its growing understanding of C4I/BM systems.
• Naval Forces: Egypt's naval capabilities were not a major concern for Israel.

Israel vs. Lebanon and Hezbollah

• Land Forces: Hezbollah had a significant impact on Israeli operations in Southern Lebanon.
• Air Forces: Hezbollah's use of rockets and missiles was a major concern.
• Naval Forces: Lebanon's naval capabilities were limited, but Hezbollah's presence in the region was a proxy war threat.

Conclusion

The document highlights the challenges Israel faces in maintaining its military edge due to budget constraints, political issues, and the modernization of Arab states. Despite significant qualitative advantages in technology and training, Israel's military is vulnerable to low-intensity warfare and potential sudden conflicts with Syria and Hezbollah. The need for a substantial increase in military spending and the development of advanced defense systems remain critical for Israel's strategic preparedness.