金融行动特别工作组-阿曼打击洗钱和恐怖主义融资的措施（英）-2024.12_283页_4mb

报告摘要

Summary of Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures in Oman

Core Content

This document is a Mutual Evaluation Report on Oman's anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) measures, conducted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) during an on-site visit from 29 January to 14 February 2024. The report evaluates Oman's compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and provides recommendations for strengthening its AML/CFT system.

Oman is not an international financial center but has a medium-sized and well-connected financial services industry. The report highlights both compliance strengths and key deficiencies in Oman's AML/CFT framework, particularly in areas like non-profit organisations (NPOs), confiscation, financial intelligence, and international cooperation.

Main Findings

1. Risk Assessment and Understanding

Oman has a moderate understanding of ML risks and a good understanding of TF risks.
The 2023 National Risk Assessment (NRA), based on 18 topicals and sectorial assessments, shows a substantial effort in identifying and assessing ML and TF risks.
There is a developing understanding of certain ML threats, particularly in foreign ML, hawala, complex legal persons, human trafficking, DPMS, and real estate sectors.
The geographic proximity to conflict zones and the cash-based economy increase exposure to ML/TF risks.

2. Legal and Institutional Framework

Oman has a new AML/CFT law (2016) and other reforms that have improved its institutional and legislative framework.
The National Center for Financial Investigation (NCFI) is a strong and well-resourced FIU that uses sophisticated technology for financial intelligence.
The National AML/CFT Committee provides an effective coordination framework for AML/CFT activities.

3. Financial Intelligence and Investigations

Authorities regularly use financial intelligence to trace ML and TF activities.
NCFI produces high-quality operational analysis using AI tools, but its strategic analysis function needs improvement.
DGC uses financial intelligence for cross-border predicate offences but not for ML cases.
STR reporting from high-risk sectors like DPMS and real estate is low, limiting the scope of financial intelligence.

4. Investigation and Prosecution

Oman has a good legal and institutional framework for investigating and prosecuting ML.
LEAs and NCFI are well-trained and resourced.
Conviction rates for ML are limited, and self-laundering cases are prioritized over other types.
Cross-border cash/BNI declarations and investigations are insufficiently used.

5. Confiscation and Asset Recovery

Confiscation is a strategic objective in Oman, and good results have been achieved through small and high-value asset seizures.
Confiscation of property of equivalent value is underutilized to recover dissipated funds.
Asset management is supported by an "Administration" but is under-resourced and not systematically used.
International cooperation in asset recovery is effective, but the number and value of cases are low.

6. Terrorist Financing (TF)

Oman has a strong legal and operational framework to detect, investigate, and prosecute TF.
TF convictions are secured for fund movement-related activities, which aligns with the country's risk profile.
Alternative measures like extradition, residency revocation, and asset confiscation are used when convictions are not possible.
UNSCR 1373 compliance is demonstrated, but proactive designation to the local list is hesitant.

7. Proliferation Financing (PF)

Oman has an adequate legal framework for PF-related TFS since 2021.
A national screening exercise identified no PF-related assets.
The PF Coordination Group improved national cooperation.
DNFBP supervisors need to improve the comprehensiveness of PF-related TFS implementation.

8. Preventive Measures

FIs have a more mature understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations.
DNFBPs have a limited understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations.
Customer Due Diligence (CDD) and record-keeping are generally strong, but STR reporting frequency needs improvement in line with a risk-based approach.
Internal controls are adequate across all reporting entities.

9. Supervision

Supervisors have adequate resources and implement a risk-based approach.
FI supervisors are more mature in understanding ML/TF risks than DNFBP supervisors.
Onsite inspections by CBO and CMA are frequent, but DNFBP supervision is recent and impact is emerging.
Supervisors need to improve the effectiveness of their actions and focus more on the risk-based approach.

10. International Cooperation

Oman takes a collaborative approach to international cooperation.
Authorities provide and seek timely and effective assistance in MLA and extradition requests.
Informal cooperation with foreign counterparts is routine.
Improvements are needed in human trafficking and cross-border offence cooperation.

Key Deficiencies

NPOs are overly monitored with excessive measures, which may discourage legitimate activities.
STR reporting from high-risk sectors is low.
Confiscation of equivalent value property is underused.
DNFBP supervision lacks comprehensiveness and focus.
Strategic analysis by NCFI needs improvement.
Cross-border cash/BNI declarations and investigations are insufficient.
Understanding of ML/TF risks is uneven across sectors and authorities.

Priority Actions

Improve strategic analysis capabilities of NCFI.
Enhance STR reporting from high-risk sectors.
Implement confiscation of equivalent value property more effectively.
Strengthen risk-based supervision for NPOs and DNFBPs.
Expand cross-border investigations and cooperation on ML and TF.
Improve understanding and implementation of ML/TF obligations among DNFBPs.
Focus supervisory actions on the risk-based approach.
Develop more comprehensive training and outreach programs for PF-related TFS.

Effectiveness & Technical Compliance

Oman has strong compliance with the FATF standards, with only one moderate deficiency (Recommendation 8 on NPOs).
Effectiveness is mixed, with some areas showing positive outcomes and others requiring more time to assess impact.
Structural reforms and new policies are beginning to show results, but long-term impact remains to be seen.

Conclusion

Oman has made significant progress in strengthening its AML/CFT system through legal reforms, institutional coordination, and improved financial intelligence. However, there are key areas for improvement, particularly in sector-specific risk understanding, STR reporting, confiscation effectiveness, and international cooperation. The report recommends targeted actions to align the system more closely with Oman's risk profile and FATF standards.