FATF-阿拉伯联合酋长国打击洗钱和资助恐怖主义的措施（英文）-2020.4-288页_4mb

Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures in the United Arab Emirates

Executive Summary

This report summarizes the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as of the on-site visit from 1–18 July 2019. It evaluates the UAE's compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the effectiveness of its AML/CFT system, offering recommendations for improvement.

Key Findings

• Significant Improvements: The UAE has made substantial progress in its AML/CFT system, including the development of the National Risk Assessment (NRA), legislative and regulatory enhancements, and strengthened coordination mechanisms.
• Emerging Understanding: Authorities have begun to better understand and mitigate ML/TF risks, with the NRA serving as a good starting point for identifying national vulnerabilities. However, it lacks depth in addressing complex ML issues.
• Financial Intelligence Framework: The UAE has access to a broad range of financial information sources, but these are not fully utilized in ML investigations or in tracing proceeds of crime. Customs data and international cooperation are underutilized.
• Legal and Regulatory Gaps: The FIU has limited capacity and expertise, which affects the quality of financial intelligence. The system for confiscating proceeds of crime, particularly from foreign predicate offences, is not fully effective.
• ML Investigations and Prosecutions: While there has been an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions, the number of convictions is low, especially in Dubai. The system lacks coherence in handling ML cases, particularly those involving professional networks or trade-based ML.
• TF and PF Convictions and Sanctions: The UAE has a high conviction rate for TF (82%) and has implemented targeted financial sanctions (TFS) to some extent. However, these measures are not consistently applied or understood, especially by the private sector.
• DNFBPs and Legal Persons: The UAE has a fragmented system of company registries, leading to inconsistent implementation of beneficial ownership requirements and creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.
• International Cooperation: The UAE has not effectively demonstrated its capacity to provide and request formal international cooperation, which is crucial for making the country less attractive to criminals.

Risks and General Situation

• Major Financial Hub: The UAE is a significant international and regional financial center with a wide range of financial institutions and DNFBPs.
• High ML/TF Risk Profile: The UAE's cash-intensive economy, large remittances, active trade in gold and precious metals, and presence of foreign residents contribute to inherent ML/TF risks.
• Sectoral Vulnerabilities: Key vulnerabilities include banking, money service businesses, and dealers in precious metals and stones. Free zones (FFZs, CFZs) have different risk profiles based on their activities.
• Geographic and Political Factors: Proximity to conflict zones and countries under UN sanctions increases the risk of ML/TF and proliferation financing abuse.

Overall Level of Compliance and Effectiveness

• Legal Framework: The UAE has made legal and regulatory improvements, including the 2018 AML Law and 2019 By-Law. However, the framework is relatively new, and its effectiveness has not been fully demonstrated.
• Technical Compliance: While some areas show compliance, key deficiencies remain in risk assessment and mitigation, TFS implementation, beneficial ownership requirements, and FIU analysis functions.
• Need for Improvement: Fundamental and major improvements are necessary to ensure the UAE's AML/CFT system cannot be exploited for ML/TF or proliferation financing.

Priority Actions

• Enhance Risk Assessment and Mitigation: Develop more comprehensive and accurate risk assessments, particularly for ML/TF and proliferation financing.
• Strengthen Financial Intelligence Utilization: Improve the use of financial intelligence, including customs data and international cooperation, to address ML and PF risks.
• Improve FIU Capacity and Functionality: Enhance the FIU's analytical capabilities and ensure it plays a more active role in disseminating intelligence on high-risk issues.
• Implement Effective Sanctions: Ensure that sanctions are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, particularly for DNFBPs and legal persons.
• Address Regulatory Arbitrage: Standardize beneficial ownership requirements across all company registries to prevent misuse of legal persons.
• Enhance International Cooperation: Strengthen the formal mechanisms for international legal assistance, freezing, and confiscation of assets.
• Improve Case Management and Statistics: Develop robust case management systems and improve the collection and presentation of statistics related to ML/TF investigations.

Conclusion

The UAE has made notable strides in improving its AML/CFT system, particularly through the development of the NRA and the introduction of new legal frameworks. However, the system's effectiveness in mitigating sophisticated ML/TF and proliferation financing risks remains limited. Key areas for improvement include enhancing the FIU's role, improving the implementation of TFS and PF measures, and addressing regulatory fragmentation. Strengthening international cooperation and ensuring that sanctions are proportionate and dissuasive are also critical to the UAE's AML/CFT efforts.