2003年-世界发展银行全球_Public_Money_for_Private_Infrastructure___Deciding_When_to_Offer_Guarantees_Output-based_Subsidies_and_Other_Fiscal_Support_67页_2mb

Summary of "Public Money for Private Infrastructure"

Core Content

This World Bank Working Paper explores the appropriate use of fiscal support mechanisms in private infrastructure projects, particularly in developing countries. It provides a framework for governments to evaluate the costs and benefits of various fiscal instruments and their alignment with specific policy objectives. The paper emphasizes the importance of transparency, targeting, and institutional quality in decision-making processes.

Main Objectives of Fiscal Support

Governments may provide fiscal support for private infrastructure projects for the following reasons:

1. Internalizing Externalities in Infrastructure Markets
   • Positive externalities arise when the social value of a service exceeds the private cost. For example, public health benefits from sewerage connections may justify subsidies.
2. Overcoming Failures in Markets for Financing Infrastructure
   • Financial markets may be incomplete or imperfect, making it difficult for private firms to secure financing. Fiscal support can help bridge these gaps.
3. Mitigating Political-and-Regulatory Risks
   • These risks arise from government actions or regulatory decisions. For instance, price controls or expropriation risks can deter private investment.
4. Circumventing Political Constraints on Prices or Profits
   • In many developing countries, governments may keep infrastructure prices artificially low, which can discourage private investment. Fiscal support can help offset these constraints.
5. Redistributing Resources to the Poor via Infrastructure
   • Infrastructure projects can be used to improve living standards for the poor, even if not economically efficient.

Key Fiscal Instruments

The paper identifies six types of fiscal instruments:

1. Output-Based Cash Subsidies
   • Subsidies tied to the output of the project (e.g., electricity consumption). These are often well-targeted and transparent.
2. In-Kind Grants
   • Non-monetary support such as land or services. These are less transparent and may not be as targeted.
3. Tax Breaks
   • Reductions in tax liabilities for private firms. These are also less transparent and may not be as targeted.
4. Capital Contributions
   • Direct financial contributions from the government to the project. These are less transparent and may not be as targeted.
5. Guarantees of Risks Under the Government's Control
   • Support for risks that the government can influence (e.g., regulatory changes). These are less transparent and may not be as targeted.
6. Guarantees of Risks Not Under the Government's Control
   • Support for risks outside the government's control (e.g., exchange rate fluctuations). These are more transparent but may not be as targeted.

Cost Analysis of Instruments

The paper outlines a framework for comparing the costs of different fiscal instruments using the present value of expected cash flows. It discusses how to estimate the cost of each instrument, including:

• Output-Based Cash Subsidies: Often have clear costs and can be well-targeted.
• In-Kind Grants: May be less transparent and more difficult to quantify.
• Tax Breaks: Costs are often opaque and not subject to standard expenditure controls.
• Capital Contributions: May be more transparent but still require careful analysis.
• Guarantees of Risks Under the Government's Control: Costs depend on the likelihood and severity of the risk.
• Guarantees of Risks Not Under the Government's Control: May be more costly due to the uncertainty involved.

Accuracy and Targeting

The paper argues that output-based cash subsidies are generally better targeted and more transparent than other instruments. However, they are not always cost-effective. Other instruments may be more appropriate in specific contexts, such as when addressing political-and-regulatory risks. The paper also highlights the importance of accurate targeting and the use of tools like ROC analysis to assess how well different instruments meet the intended objectives.

Institutional Considerations

To make better decisions, the paper suggests improving the institutional framework for fiscal support. This includes:

• Ensuring transparency in the cost of support.
• Improving targeting of subsidies to achieve policy goals.
• Enhancing accountability and incentives for decision-makers.
• Separating decision-making from delivery to avoid conflicts of interest.
• Involving those who are responsible for costs in the decision process.
• Utilizing decision-making forums that emphasize trade-offs between different objectives.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that while fiscal support is often necessary for private infrastructure projects, especially in developing countries, it must be carefully evaluated. Governments should consider the objectives, costs, and accuracy of targeting when choosing the appropriate instrument. It also emphasizes the need for institutional improvements to ensure that decisions are made based on sound analysis rather than self-interest.

Key Information

• The report does not provide universally applicable recommendations but offers a framework for evaluating fiscal support instruments.
• Output-based cash subsidies are highlighted as potentially the best option due to their targeting accuracy and transparency.
• Political-and-regulatory risks are best addressed through government guarantees.
• The fiscal impact of support instruments can vary significantly depending on the project and context.
• Transparency and accountability are essential for effective fiscal support decision-making.

Tables and Figures

• Table 1-1: Options Most Likely to Address Government Objectives
• Figure 1-1: Stylized Process for Deciding Whether to Provide Fiscal Support
• Figure 4-1: Fiscal Support, Project Economics, and the Policy Environment
• Figure 7-1: Accuracy of Targeting
• Figure 7-2: Accuracy of two Criteria for Targeting Assistance to the Poor in Honduras: ROC Analysis
• Figure 9-1: Incentives, Information, and Decisionmakers
• Figure A-1: Monthly and Cumulative Revenue: One Possible Path
• Figure A-2: Estimated Frequency Distribution of Guarantee Payments
• Figure A-3: Expected Payments Under the Capped and Uncapped Subsidy Schemes

References and Boxes

• Box 2-1: Provides definitions for key terms such as fiscal support, infrastructure, and risk.
• Box 6-1: Estimating the cost of a concessional loan by reference to commercial interest rates.
• Box 6-2: Estimating the cost of an equity contribution using the CAPM.
• Box 6-3: Estimating the cost of a concessional loan and a loan guarantee by option pricing.
• Box 6-4: Assessing the fiscal impact of Colombian government guarantees.
• Box 6-5: Illustrative estimation of the cost of bearing construction risk from Victoria, Australia.
• Box 9-1: The International Monetary Fund Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency.

This working paper serves as a guide for governments to make informed and transparent decisions regarding fiscal support for private infrastructure projects.