2012年-世界发展银行全球_The_Polish_Bank_Insolvency_Regime___Issues_and_Assumption_Paper_for_the_Design_of_an_Upgraded_Bank_Resolution_Framework_71页_733kb

Summary of the Polish Bank Insolvency Regime Issues and Assumption Paper

Core Content

This document outlines the need for an upgraded bank resolution framework in Poland, aiming to enhance financial stability, protect depositors and creditors, and minimize the use of public funds. It is based on a request from the Government of Poland and prepared by the World Bank in collaboration with the Polish Deposit Guarantee Agency (BFG) and the Polish Working Group on Bank Resolution.

The report emphasizes the inadequacy of traditional bankruptcy procedures for banks, which are too slow and do not allow for early intervention. It proposes a new legal regime that replaces the current insolvency process and incorporates modern resolution tools aligned with international standards, particularly those recommended by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the European Commission (EC).

Main Views

• Modernization of Bank Insolvency Framework: Poland's current legal system does not adequately address the unique challenges of bank insolvency. The proposed framework should allow for early intervention and swift resolution of failing banks.

• Resolution Authority: The BFG is proposed as the resolution authority, with operational independence, transparent processes, and adequate resources. It should be able to act in the best interest of creditors and minimize public costs.

• Resolution Tools: The new framework should include a range of resolution instruments such as:

  • Sale of Business Tool: Selling a bank in whole or in part to a third party.
  • Asset Separation Tool: Removing toxic assets before resolution.
  • Bridge Bank Option: Creating a temporary bank for eventual sale.
  • Debt Write-down Tool: Forcing capital injections by subordinated creditors in case of systemic importance.
  • Public Ownership Option: As a last resort to prevent systemic disruption.

• Creditor Hierarchy and Compensation: Creditors should be compensated according to a pre-defined hierarchy based on the seniority and priority of their claims. The resolution process must ensure that no creditor is worse off than in a liquidation scenario.

• Asset and Liability Transfers: Assets and liabilities should be transferred swiftly to voluntary buyers, with the use of deposit insurance funds to fill balance sheet gaps. The BFG should open a resolution sub-account to support these operations.

• Legal and Market Safeguards: The resolution process should avoid unnecessary value destruction, promote market discipline, and ensure transparency and predictability through clear legal and procedural frameworks.

• Cross-Border Coordination: The framework should include legal provisions for cooperation with foreign resolution authorities, especially in cases involving cross-border banks and subsidiaries. This includes pre-agreed mechanisms for information sharing and burden distribution.

• Resolvability Assessments and Planning: Resolution plans must be regularly assessed for adequacy, and contingency measures should be in place for systemic crises. The Financial Stability Committee (FSC) should be the consultative body for exceptional mechanisms.

Key Information

• Banking Sector Overview: The banking sector accounts for 89% of the credit sector's total assets, with cooperative banks holding 6%. The only state-owned bank is BGK, supervised by KNF and insured by BFG.

• Resolution Triggers: The resolution process should be triggered based on well-defined indicators of actual or imminent insolvency, legal breaches of thresholds, or an assessment of the likelihood of bank failure.

• Funding Mechanisms: The deposit insurance fund and resolution fund should be combined to minimize fiscal outlays. Additional bank levies can be used to bolster the fund. In case of insufficient funds, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) may be involved in gap funding.

• Legal Framework: The new framework should ensure the continuity of critical banking functions such as payments and settlements. It should also respect secured financial contracts and prevent unnecessary disruptions.

• International Comparisons: The report draws on experiences from other countries such as the U.S., UK, Spain, Germany, Canada, and Japan, highlighting best practices in resolution tools, creditor protection, and cross-border coordination.

• Crisis Management Groups: The FSC (comprising MoF, NBP, KNF, and BFG) should be involved in crisis management, with the resolution authority having the right to access information and coordinate with foreign authorities.

Conclusion

The document advocates for a comprehensive and modernized bank resolution framework in Poland, emphasizing the importance of speed, transparency, and the protection of depositors and creditors. It calls for the establishment of a dedicated resolution authority, the use of advanced resolution tools, and the integration of international best practices to ensure financial stability and market discipline.