2016年-世界发展银行全球_Russian_Federation_Financial_Sector_Assessment_Program___Macroprudential_Policy_41页_1mb
报告摘要
RUSSIAN FEDERATION: MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY ASSESSMENT SUMMARY
Core Content
This document provides an assessment of the macroprudential policy framework in the Russian Federation, focusing on the institutional arrangements, the use of macroprudential tools, and the technical capacity of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to monitor and assess systemic risks. The analysis is conducted in the context of the IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and outlines key findings, main strengths, and recommendations for improving the macroprudential policy framework.
Main Viewpoints
- Macroprudential Oversight: The CBR is the primary authority responsible for macroprudential oversight, with the Financial Stability Committee (FSCom) playing a key coordinating role. The National Council on Ensuring Financial Stability (FSC) serves as an advisory body, with its role and responsibilities clarified in February 2015.
- Macroprudential Tools: CBR has used a range of macroprudential tools, including reserve requirements, capital risk weights, provisioning rules, and liquidity requirements, to address systemic risks such as excessive unsecured consumer lending, mortgage lending to high-risk borrowers, and foreign currency exposure.
- Systemic Risks: The Russian economy is highly exposed to oil price volatility, which can significantly impact financial conditions and amplify business cycles. The CBR has taken steps to mitigate these risks, but more tools and stronger legal foundations are needed.
- Effectiveness of Measures: While some macroprudential tools have been effective in curbing credit risk, there is a lack of conclusive evidence that they have significantly moderated credit growth. Additional tools and better calibration are recommended.
Key Information
Policy Framework
- The CBR is the single financial regulator and supervisor since September 2013 and has taken on macroprudential responsibilities.
- The FSC was established in 2013 as an advisory body and was strengthened in 2015 to enhance inter-agency coordination.
- The CBR Law does not provide a full legal basis for macroprudential policy, limiting the scope of tools available to the central bank.
Use of Macroprudential Tools
- Reserve Requirements: Differentiated reserve requirements were introduced in 2004–08 to limit reliance on foreign funding. These were re-imposed in 2011 and further adjusted in 2016 to reduce dollarization.
- Capital Risk Weights: CBR has applied differentiated capital risk weights to unsecured consumer loans and mortgage lending to manage credit risk. In 2014, caps on effective lending rates were introduced.
- Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCB): Implemented in 2016, the CCB is the main countercyclical tool, calibrated using indicators like credit-to-GDP gaps and nonperforming loan (NPL) ratios.
- Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR): Applied to systemically important banks (SIBs) starting in 2016, with a minimum of 70%. The CBR has also introduced the Committed Liquidity Facility (CLF) to support liquidity needs.
- Capital Surcharge on SIBs: A 0.15% surcharge was introduced in 2016, with gradual increases to 1% by 2019.
Assessment of Financial Stability
- The CBR has managed to maintain financial stability despite external shocks such as low oil prices and Western sanctions.
- Systemic risks related to unsecured consumer lending have been mitigated through tighter provisioning and capital risk weights.
- The corporate sector has shown signs of financial stress, with increased nonperforming loans (NPLs) and reduced debt servicing capacity, especially among smaller firms.
- Household credit quality has also deteriorated, but mortgage lending remains resilient.
- Exchange rate risks are manageable due to the presence of large foreign-currency deposits and sufficient liquid assets to cover external debt obligations.
Recommendations
| Recommendations | Authority Responsible | Timeframe |
|---|---|---|
| Amend CBR Law to provide a comprehensive macroprudential toolkit | CBR, MOF | Short term |
| Expand use of macroprudential tools to build adequate buffers | CBR | Medium term |
| Further develop macrofinancial and systemic risk analysis | CBR | Medium term |
| Use macroprudential tools to support de-dollarization, primarily for systemic risk mitigation | CBR | Short term |
| Adjust calibration of CCB using a wider set of indicators | CBR | Short term |
| Clarify FSC's responsibilities in line with its advisory role | Government | Short term |
| Formalize regular CBR Board meetings to discuss systemic risks | CBR | Short term |
| Enhance transparency and accountability of CBR's macroprudential policy | CBR | Short term |
| Improve Financial Stability Review to better communicate risks and resilience | CBR | Short term |
| Strengthen prudential liquidity requirements | CBR | Medium term |
| Consider amending CBR Law to more fully prescribe the financial stability framework | CBR, MOF | Medium term |
| Establish a dedicated Financial Policy Committee within CBR | CBR, MOF | Medium term |
| Increase capacity to obtain corporate and household balance sheet information | CBR | Medium term |
Conclusion
The Russian Federation has made progress in developing a macroprudential policy framework, with the CBR playing a central role. However, the legal basis for macroprudential policy remains limited, and the use of tools has not been fully comprehensive or effective in curbing credit growth. Institutional coordination and transparency need to be strengthened, and more sophisticated tools should be introduced to better manage systemic risks and support financial stability in the medium term.
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