斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-Iraq_-The-UNSCOM-Experience_12页_202kb

Summary of the Iraq: The UNSCOM Experience Document

Introduction

The document provides an analysis of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 687, 707, and 715 in Iraq, focusing on the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) programmes. It highlights the challenges faced by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in verifying Iraq's compliance and the implications of these challenges for future arms control efforts. The report was prepared by SIPRI researchers and published in late September 1998.

Background

Iraq, located in a harsh physical environment and a complex ethnic and political landscape, has a long history of conflict. The Ba'ath Party, led by Saddam Hussein, came to power in 1968, and Hussein became a key figure in the regime. The Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988) was marked by the extensive use of chemical weapons (CW) by Iraq, despite its commitments under the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Iraq also developed biological weapons (BW) and ballistic missiles, which raised international concerns.

The UNSCOM Regime

UNSCOM was established in 1991 under Resolution 687 to oversee the destruction of Iraq's non-conventional weapons and related infrastructure. Its main functions include inspecting and overseeing the destruction of CBW and ballistic missile capabilities, as well as monitoring Iraq to ensure continued compliance. The IAEA was responsible for nuclear weapons, but UNSCOM provided logistical and technical support to the IAEA.

UNSCOM's monitoring strategy included unannounced inspections, aerial surveillance, and camera monitoring. It also required a system for tracking the export and import of dual-use items—materials and technologies that could be used for both civilian and military purposes. This system was established under Resolution 1051 in 1996.

Main Findings of UNSCOM

Despite seven years of inspections, UNSCOM has not been able to fully certify the destruction of Iraq's CBW programmes. Key findings include:

• Chemical Weapons: Iraq had developed a wide range of CW agents, including VX, the most toxic nerve agent. The programme was extensive, with evidence of the production of up to 50–100 tonnes of VX before the Gulf War. Iraq claimed to have destroyed 15,620 chemical munitions, but this has not been verified.

• Biological Weapons: Iraq may have produced up to 10 billion doses of BW agents such as anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin. The BW programme was largely hidden, with key research and production sites remaining secret until 1995 when a defector revealed its scope. There are suspicions that Iraq may have used aflatoxin as a cover for more destructive agents.

• Export Controls: Iraq relied heavily on imports for its CBW and BW programmes. Western companies were involved in the design and construction of facilities and the sale of precursor chemicals. The former Warsaw Treaty Organization countries also contributed to Iraq's NBC capabilities through training and equipment supply.

The Present Crisis

Since 1997, tensions between UNSCOM and the Iraqi government have escalated. Iraq has resisted full disclosure and access to its facilities, leading to a breakdown in cooperation and a potential for renewed military action. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 1998 was intended to resolve these issues, but it has since unraveled.

Key events include:

• Denial of Access: Iraq denied access to presidential sites, claiming they were sovereign territory. This led to the expulsion of US inspectors in October 1997.
• VX Dispute: In June 1998, UNSCOM discovered evidence of VX in Iraqi unilaterally destroyed missile fragments, which fueled international suspicion.
• Sanctions Review: Iraq has repeatedly demanded a review of economic sanctions, arguing it has fulfilled its obligations. The UK and the USA fear this would set a dangerous precedent for future inspections.

Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions on Iraq primarily involve an oil embargo, except for humanitarian imports. These sanctions are conditional on UNSCOM's verification that Iraq has destroyed all NBC weapons and related infrastructure. Iraq's continued resistance to full cooperation has kept the sanctions in place, despite its claims of compliance.

UNSCOM's Future

The future of UNSCOM remains uncertain. While the agency has made progress in destroying CBW and BW materials, it has not been able to confirm the full destruction of Iraq's programmes. The ongoing refusal of Iraq to cooperate and the political dynamics within the UN Security Council threaten the effectiveness of UNSCOM. The resignation of Scott Ritter in August 1998 further highlighted the challenges facing the agency.

Key Issues and Implications

• Verification Challenges: The lack of complete information and cooperation from Iraq has hindered UNSCOM's ability to verify full compliance.
• Long-term Strategy: Saddam Hussein appears to have pursued a long-term strategy of concealment, which has been a recurring theme in the history of Iraq's non-conventional weapon programmes.
• Arms Control Lessons: The UNSCOM experience is significant for arms control, as it represents one of the most intrusive verification regimes ever. It underscores the need for more rigorous monitoring systems in the future.
• Regional Disarmament: The case of Iraq provides important lessons for the Middle East, particularly in terms of establishing effective disarmament regimes.

Conclusion

The UNSCOM experience illustrates the difficulties of verifying and enforcing arms control agreements, especially in a politically complex and resistant state. While some progress has been made in the destruction of Iraq's CBW and BW programmes, the lack of full disclosure and cooperation has left many uncertainties. The implications of this experience are far-reaching, influencing future disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.