斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-Exports-of-dual_14页_540kb

Summary of "EXPORTS OF DUAL-USE CHEMICALS TO SYRIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION EXPORT CONTROLS"

I. Introduction

The export of dual-use chemicals to Syria has raised concerns due to the risk of these items being diverted for the development or use of chemical weapons. The European Union (EU) has a dual-use export control system aimed at balancing trade facilitation and non-proliferation goals. This system is based on EU law, which is binding on all member states, and it requires prior authorization from national authorities before controlled items can be exported. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) also plays a central role in shaping the legal framework for chemical exports, emphasizing the need to avoid hindering peaceful chemical trade while ensuring that chemical weapon proliferation is prevented.

II. Legal Framework

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

• The CWC requires states to implement national measures to prevent the use of chemicals for prohibited purposes.
• It divides chemicals into three schedules (lists) based on their sensitivity and potential for use in chemical weapons.
• Schedule 1 includes chemicals with minimal or no peaceful uses, and their transfer is strictly controlled.
• Schedule 2 covers chemicals with potential for use in chemical weapons, including those with phosphorus atoms.
• Schedule 3 includes chemicals that are commercially produced but have been used or stockpiled as chemical weapons in the past or are precursors to such agents.
• The CWC does not restrict the peaceful use of chemicals and encourages international cooperation in chemical activities.

The Australia Group (AG)

• The AG is a forum of 41 countries that share information and guidelines on controlling the export of dual-use items of proliferation concern.
• It has developed common control lists that include chemical weapon precursors and dual-use manufacturing facilities.
• The AG has been particularly active in scrutinizing chemical exports to Syria due to its suspected chemical and biological weapons programs.
• In 2013, AG members emphasized the need for increased vigilance and specific scrutiny of exports to Syria, including five chemicals not on the common control list.

EU Dual-Use Export Control System

• The EU has harmonized its dual-use export control system since 1994, with the first laws entering into force in 1995.
• The current regulation is Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, which outlines the export control regime for dual-use items, technology, and transit.
• Export authorizations are required for items listed in the annex to the regulation, and are granted in the form of export licenses.
• There are four types of export licenses: general, national general, global, and individual.
• The EU legislation includes criteria for assessing the plausibility of end-use and the risk of diversion, and requires member states to consider their international non-proliferation obligations.

III. Chemicals Subject to Control

• The global chemical industry is vast, with an annual value of around €3 trillion, and involves many thousands of companies.
• The CWC and the Australia Group aim to control chemicals that could contribute to chemical weapon programs, but not all chemicals are prohibited.
• The CWC defines a chemical weapon as any chemical that can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm through its chemical action on life processes.
• The CWC's schedules are not exhaustive, and the Convention emphasizes that the lists are not intended to be comprehensive.
• The OPCW has compiled a database of over 29,000 chemicals, but it acknowledges that not all possible chemical combinations are included.
• The use of industrial chemistry techniques means that even chemicals not explicitly listed in the schedules can be used to produce chemical weapons if they are transferred without proper authorization.

IV. EU Restrictive Measures Against Syria

• The EU has imposed restrictive measures against Syria since 2005, following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri.
• These measures include bans on arms, repression equipment, and luxury goods such as gold and diamonds.
• In 2012, the EU expanded its restrictive measures to include dual-use chemicals, which are now subject to prior authorization.
• In 2013, the EU further amended its regulations, introducing a new list of chemicals that are not controlled under the dual-use export regulation but still require authorization for export to Syria.

V. Key Considerations

• Despite the CWC and EU export controls, the risk of chemical diversion to Syria remains a concern due to the country's suspected chemical and biological weapons programs.
• The AG has highlighted the use of front companies and other tactics by Syria to obscure its procurement of dual-use items.
• The EU's export control system is designed to prevent proliferation while allowing legitimate trade, but the complexity of chemical transactions makes this a challenging task.
• The lack of a comprehensive list of countries of proliferation concern complicates the enforcement of export controls.

VI. Conclusion

• The EU's dual-use export control system is an essential mechanism for preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons while facilitating peaceful trade.
• However, the system is not foolproof, and the case of Syria demonstrates the difficulties in ensuring that dual-use chemicals are not diverted for illicit purposes.
• The combination of CWC obligations, Australia Group guidelines, and EU restrictive measures aims to mitigate these risks, but vigilance and continuous monitoring remain necessary.