2024-08-04-国际清算银行-加密货币交换代币（英）_44页_812kb

Summary

This BIS working paper examines the economic dynamics of "crypto exchange tokens" (CETs) issued by centralized cryptocurrency exchanges. CETs serve as a major funding source for exchanges, raising billions of dollars, and have been central to industry disruptions like the FTX collapse. However, buyback pledges often used to price-stabilize tokens are costly and potentially risky.

The paper develops a tractable theoretical model incorporating user demand (for discounts/access), speculative investor demand, and exchange buyback pledges. Equilibrium exchange rates depend on pledged resources relative to user demand, defining two regimes:

1. Utility Regime: Pledges are small. Only users seeking benefits hold tokens. Price appreciation depends solely on user demand growth.
2. Investment Regime: Pledges are large. Both users and investors (anticipating price appreciation) hold tokens. Price appreciation during the buyback period incorporates investor return expectations and the exchange's default risk.

The analysis shows buyback pledges increase funds raised but incur high costs (discounted costs typically exceed generated funds), making traditional capital markets potentially superior for exchanges with access. The paper highlights a significant manipulation risk: large (or coordinated small) investors can "burn" (permanently remove) tokens bought with pledged resources, forcing the exchange to continuously buy back at escalating prices, profiting while undermining the exchange. To mitigate this, exchanges should limit buyback pledges to no more than 50% of issued tokens.

In conclusion, while CETs and buyback pledges provide funding, they are inefficient and susceptible to manipulation due to restricted capital market access for some platforms or specific token characteristics.