战略与国际研究中心-PONARS-Policy-Memo-276_3页_161kb

The Future of U.S.-Russian Nuclear Relations: A Rip Van Winkle Approach?

Core Content

The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed in May 2002 by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, marks the de facto end of traditional U.S.-Russian strategic arms control negotiations. This treaty is notable for its brevity (only three pages) and lack of detailed provisions, such as definitions of what should be reduced, counting rules, or verification mechanisms. Instead, it relies on the START I agreement as a verification framework until 2009, after which the future of nuclear reductions remains uncertain.

Main Points

• SORT as a New Paradigm: The Moscow Treaty represents a shift from previous comprehensive arms control agreements like START I. It focuses on reducing strategic nuclear arsenals but lacks the specificity and enforceability of earlier treaties.

• Lack of Follow-Up Dialogue: A Consultative Group for Strategic Security was established to address unresolved issues, but it has only met once since May 2002, focusing on unrelated topics such as Iraq and Georgia rather than nuclear matters.

• Strategic Shifts: Both the U.S. and Russia have moved away from the traditional Cold War framework. The U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty without significant consequences, and Russia effectively abandoned START II in exchange. This allowed Russia to retain its MIRVed ICBMs and avoid costly modernization.

• Russia's Interest in Post-SORT Talks: Russia seeks to address U.S. responsive forces through future negotiations, but has not yet been willing to propose new topics like tactical nuclear weapons. The use of START I provisions to gain U.S. concessions has failed, potentially undermining the treaty.

• U.S. Disinterest in Further Talks: The U.S. has achieved its strategic goals with SORT and is unlikely to pursue further reductions or concessions. This creates a distrustful environment for future dialogue, especially if Russia continues to push for new agenda items.

• Rip Van Winkle Approach: This refers to a strategy where both sides limit discussions to compliance with existing treaties rather than addressing new nuclear issues. It could reduce the risk of nuclear deterrence affecting broader political relations.

• Risk of START I Erosion: If Russia continues to seek concessions on U.S. responsive forces and fails to achieve them, it may pressure for an earlier expiration of START I or even modify its rules to allow greater flexibility in nuclear deployment.

• Recommendations for a Cautious Approach:

  • Prioritize Realistic Goals: Both sides should focus on achievable objectives before the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
  • Positive Agenda: Emphasize cooperative threat reduction, missile defense cooperation, and data exchange initiatives.
  • Regional Cooperation: Strengthen military cooperation in the Caucasus and Central Asia to build trust and justify greater transparency on tactical nuclear weapons.
  • Relax START Restrictions: Consider easing some START-imposed restrictions to ensure the continuation of the verification regime beyond 2009.

Key Information

• SORT's Impact: It is a significant departure from earlier arms control agreements and signals a new phase in U.S.-Russian nuclear relations.
• Verification Challenges: The absence of clear counting rules and verification mechanisms in SORT raises concerns about compliance and transparency.
• Strategic Posture: Both nations have re-evaluated their nuclear postures, with the U.S. focusing on modernization and Russia on cost-effective maintenance of its arsenal.
• Tactical Nuclear Arms: Russia has resisted including tactical nuclear weapons in arms control discussions, citing their strategic importance in potential conflicts with Asian powers.
• Future Outlook: The future of U.S.-Russian nuclear relations may hinge on whether both sides are willing to engage in new, meaningful dialogue or continue with a limited, compliance-focused approach.

Conclusion

The SORT treaty has reshaped U.S.-Russian nuclear relations, moving them away from comprehensive negotiations toward a more fragmented and selective dialogue. The lack of interest in new topics and the reliance on compliance with existing treaties suggest a Rip Van Winkle approach. However, this strategy may not be sustainable in the long term, as both sides have different strategic priorities and the risk of eroding trust and treaty commitments remains. A cautious, cooperative approach focusing on data exchange, missile defense, and regional security is recommended to maintain stability in nuclear relations.