斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-Strengthening-Global-Regimes--Addressing-the-Threat-Posed-by-Chemical-Weapons_48页_407kb

Summary of SIPRI Policy Paper No. 57: Strengthening Global Regimes - Addressing the Threat Posed by Chemical Weapons

Core Content

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is presented as a comprehensive and effective global disarmament agreement, with 193 states parties and a commitment to the permanent prohibition of chemical weapons (CWs). It includes robust verification procedures and cooperation with the chemical industry to ensure peaceful use of chemical technology. The CWC has largely succeeded in the destruction of declared CW stockpiles from the Cold War, with completion expected by 2023. However, the threat environment is evolving, with CW use occurring in both state and non-state conflicts, and in targeted attacks on politically exposed individuals, highlighting the need for adaptation.

Main Points

• The CWC is a model for global disarmament treaties due to its comprehensive commitments and verification procedures.
• Syria's use of CWs has challenged the effectiveness of the CWC, as it has been confirmed in multiple instances despite its accession to the CWC in 2013.
• The OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) has been instrumental in attributing CW use in Syria to government forces, including the Syrian Air Force.
• Non-conflict CW use, such as the Salisbury and Kim Jong Nam incidents, has demonstrated the need to address chemical agents not traditionally classified as warfare agents, such as novichok.
• The OPCW has adapted to these new challenges by creating a ChemTech Centre, expanding forensic capabilities, and improving coordination with law enforcement and international bodies.

Key Information

• The CWC was designed to eliminate large-scale battlefield use of chemical weapons, but the changing nature of conflict has made the task of attributing CW use more complex.
• The OPCW has been tasked with new responsibilities, including the investigation of confirmed CW use in Syria, the development of a generic investigation capability, and the adaptation of the verification regime to new threats.
• The 2018 Special Session of the Conference of States Parties (CSP) led to significant decisions, including the creation of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) and the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM).
• The 2018 Salisbury incident and the 2017 Kim Jong Nam assassination are examples of non-conflict CW use, which has prompted the OPCW to update its Annex on Chemicals to include novichok agents.
• International cooperation is essential, but has been strained by geopolitical tensions, affecting the OPCW's ability to address emerging threats effectively.

Structure of the Report

The report is organized as follows:

1. Addressing the threat posed by chemical weapons: Accountability and disarmament

   • Overview of the CWC and its verification system.
   • The evolving threat environment and the challenges it poses.
   • The Syria case and the implications for the CWC.

2. Identifying the perpetrators of chemical weapons use in Syria

   • The role of the OPCW-UN JIM and the IIT in attributing CW use.
   • The impact of the Syria file on international cooperation and the CWC.

3. Facilitating attribution of chemical weapons attacks

   • The need for enhanced forensic science and technical capacity.
   • The creation of the ChemTech Centre and the development of a generic investigation capability.
   • The importance of coordination between the OPCW and law enforcement agencies.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

   • Five key recommendations for strengthening the CWC and OPCW's response to new threats:
     1. Expand the ChemTech Centre to support a broader network of laboratories and analytical methods.
     2. Accelerate the development of forensic science to aid in CW investigations.
     3. Organize discussions on the legal and practical aspects of attribution mechanisms.
     4. Enhance national and regional exercises that link the CW expert community with law enforcement.
     5. Promote a focused dialogue among international bodies on the verification of small, clandestine CW programs.

Abbreviations

• CWC: 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
• OPCW: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
• JIM: OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism
• IIT: Investigation and Identification Team
• CSP: Conference of States Parties
• ChemTech Centre: Centre for Chemistry and Technology
• novichok: A family of nerve agents not previously listed in the CWC's Annex on Chemicals

Conclusion

The report emphasizes the need for the CWC and OPCW to adapt to the evolving threat of chemical weapons, including their use in non-state conflicts and targeted attacks. It underscores the importance of international cooperation, technical capacity, and forensic science in addressing these challenges. The recommendations aim to strengthen the global chemical weapons disarmament regime and ensure it remains effective in the face of new and emerging threats.