斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-The-Future-of-the-Chemical-Weapons-Convention_-Policy-and-Planning-Aspects_48页_399kb

The Future of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Policy and Planning Aspects

Core Content

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in 1997, has primarily focused on the destruction of chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles and associated infrastructure. By April 2013, nearly 78% of declared CW agents and 46% of declared munitions and containers had been destroyed. However, the complete destruction of all CW remains a work in progress, and the convention's role is evolving to address new challenges such as the prevention of rearmament and the use of toxic chemicals by non-state actors like terrorists and criminals.

The Third CWC Review Conference, held in April 2013, represents a critical juncture for the CWC regime. It offers an opportunity for states parties to define the future direction and focus of the convention, including its operational, legal, and political relevance in the broader international security context. The conference is expected to shape the scope and priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for years to come.

Main Views and Key Information

1. The Changing International Context

• The CWC was originally framed in the context of arms control during the Cold War, but the paradigm is shifting toward non-proliferation and consequence management.
• The focus is now more on preventing the use of toxic chemicals by non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, rather than solely on the destruction of existing stockpiles.
• The UN Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks has noted that no single agency can be solely responsible for chemical or biological terrorism preparedness and response, highlighting the need for multilateral cooperation.

2. Technological Advancements and Verification

• The OPCW must adapt to scientific and technological developments that could undermine the convention’s verification mechanisms.
• The Technical Secretariat faces a growing volume of data to review, necessitating the development of organizing principles and methodologies.
• Verification remains a core challenge, as the convention must ensure that new technologies and dual-use materials do not facilitate the development or use of chemical weapons.
• The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) plays a key role in analyzing technological trends and their implications for the CWC.

3. Preparedness and Response

• The OPCW should transition from an ad hoc to a systematic and sustainable approach in international preparedness and response efforts.
• Collaboration with key partners such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and the World Health Organization (WHO) is essential.
• The CBRN Centres of Excellence, funded by the European Union, offer a new opportunity for regional cooperation in chemical safety and security.
• A security culture must be developed across the chemical industry, research, and academia to prevent the misuse of toxic chemicals.

4. Strategic Approaches for the CWC Regime

• The authors propose three strategic approaches for the future of the CWC:
  1. Status quo: Continue current implementation practices and progressively reduce resources for CW destruction and verification.
  2. Transformation: Shift the CWC regime toward an international assistance regime, with a focus on technical expertise and support for chemical threats.
  3. Balanced approach: Maintain a focus on selected core objectives, such as chemical demilitarization, non-proliferation, and international cooperation.

5. Challenges and Concerns

• The dichotomy between 'haves' and 'have-nots' is more relevant to nuclear arms control than to the CWC.
• Some states parties are reluctant to explicitly address non-proliferation within the CWC, fearing that it may imply unequal treatment of states.
• The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and China emphasize the cooperation and capacity-building nature of the CWC and the need for national implementation to be guided by the convention itself, not external frameworks.

Conclusion

The CWC must remain politically and technically engaged to ensure its continued relevance in a rapidly changing international security environment. The Third Review Conference presents a unique opportunity for states parties to define the future of the convention and its implementation. The OPCW must adapt to new challenges, including technological advancements and the growing threat of non-state actors, while maintaining its verification capacity and international cooperation. The study underscores the importance of a balanced and forward-looking approach to ensure the CWC remains a viable and effective framework for chemical disarmament and non-proliferation.