欧洲安全研究所-欧盟的化学武器制裁制度（英文）-2020.8-8页_1mb

EU's Chemical Weapons Sanctions Regime Summary

Core Content

The EU established a sanctions regime against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons in October 2018, marking its first autonomous, non-country-specific sanctions instrument in this area. This regime was created in response to the increasing use of chemical weapons, particularly in Syria and the UK, and reflects the EU's effort to uphold the global norm against chemical attacks despite the failure of UN-based mechanisms to effectively address the issue.

Main Points

• Background of the Chemical Weapons Taboo:
  The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993 prohibits the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. Despite this, chemical weapons have been used in the Syrian civil war since 2012, with the first major attack in 2013. The use of Novichok in the UK in 2018 further raised concerns about the erosion of the taboo against chemical weapons.

• EU's Response to the Taboo Erosion:
  The EU's sanctions regime was developed as a response to the breakdown of the UN Security Council's ability to address chemical weapons use in Syria. The regime is not based on a UN mandate, unlike previous sanctions against nuclear proliferation. It is a 'horizontal' or thematic sanctions list, targeting individuals and entities involved in chemical weapons use, regardless of their country of origin.

• Sanctions Targets:
  The regime includes designations for both Syria and Russia. In Syria, it targets individuals and groups responsible for chemical attacks, while in the UK incident, it includes suspects linked to the assassination attempt of Sergei Skripal. The regime aims to hold perpetrators accountable and deter further use.

• Complementary to International Mechanisms:
  The sanctions regime complements the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is responsible for verifying the elimination of chemical weapons. The EU's approach seeks to support international efforts to promote accountability, even though the OPCW lacks the authority to enforce it.

• Strategic Implications for the EU:
  The regime has implications for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), particularly in the areas of non-proliferation, multilateralism, and EU-Russia relations. It represents a shift towards more coercive measures and a broader application of sanctions, including against targeted killings.

• EU-Russia Relations:
  The EU's approach to chemical weapons sanctions is carefully balanced to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. The regime allows the EU to address Russian involvement without assigning blame to the Kremlin, thus maintaining diplomatic relations and unity among member states.

Key Information

• Chemical Weapons in Syria:
  Chemical attacks have been reported over 300 times since 2012, with over 100 confirmed cases. The OPCW's Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) and the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) were established to investigate these incidents, though JIM was terminated in 2017 due to Russian opposition.

• The Salisbury Incident:
  In March 2018, a Novichok attack on Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the UK led to a significant international reaction. The EU supported the UK's actions and called for Russia to disclose its chemical weapons program.

• International Partnership against Impunity:
  Launched by France in 2018, this coalition includes 40 states and the EU. It aims to hold individuals and entities accountable for chemical weapons use and includes a sanctions component, with members committing to publicize names of those under sanctions.

• Sanctions Regime Structure:
  The regime is a thematic list, not country-specific. It includes individuals and entities from Syria and Russia, and is designed to uphold the norm against chemical attacks by imposing costs, freezing assets, and publicizing names.

• Accountability and Future Mechanisms:
  While the EU sanctions regime does not enforce accountability, it supports international efforts to promote it, including potential referrals to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the work of the UN Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry.

Recommendations

• Harmonisation of Designations:
  The EU should harmonise its listings to avoid confusion. Currently, some actors are listed under both country-specific and thematic regimes for the same wrongdoing, complicating compliance and transparency.

• Enhanced Information Sharing:
  The EU should improve information sharing and coordination to ensure that the regime is effective and consistent across member states.

• Support for International Accountability Mechanisms:
  The EU should continue to support international institutions like the OPCW and ICC in their efforts to hold perpetrators of chemical attacks accountable.

Conclusion

The EU's chemical weapons sanctions regime is a significant step in reinforcing the global norm against chemical attacks, especially in light of the Syrian conflict and the Salisbury incident. It represents a shift towards more autonomous and thematic sanctions, balancing support for international norms with careful management of relations with Russia.